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In many online platforms, customers’ decisions are substantially influenced by product rankings as most
customers only examine a few top-ranked products. Concurrently, such platforms also use the same data cor-
responding to customers’ actions to learn how these products must be ranked or ordered. These interactions
in the underlying learning process, however, may incentivize sellers to artificially inflate their position by
employing fake users, as exemplified by the emergence of click farms. Motivated by such fraudulent behavior,
we study the ranking problem of a platform that faces a mixture of real and fake users who are indistinguish-
able from one another. We first show that existing learning algorithms—that are optimal in the absence of
fake users—may converge to highly sub-optimal rankings under manipulation by fake users. To overcome this
deficiency, we develop efficient learning algorithms under two informational environments: in the first setting,
the platform is aware of the number of fake users, and in the second setting, it is agnostic to the number
of fake users. For both these environments, we prove that our algorithms converge to the optimal ranking,
while being robust to the aforementioned fraudulent behavior; we also present worst-case performance guar-
antees for our methods, and show that they significantly outperform existing algorithms. At a high level, our
work employs several novel approaches to guarantee robustness such as: piq constructing product-ordering
graphs that encode the pairwise relationships between products inferred from the customers’ actions; and
piiq implementing multiple levels of learning with a judicious amount of bi-directional cross-learning between
levels. Overall, our results indicate that online platforms can effectively combat fraudulent users without
incurring large costs by designing new learning algorithms that guarantee efficient convergence even when
the platform is completely oblivious to the number and identity of the fake users.
Key words : product ranking, sequential search, robust learning, fake users, online platforms
1. Introduction
The abundance of substitutable products on online shopping platforms combined with consumers’
limited attention has resulted in a new form of competition among products: the race for visibility.
For example, an Amazon user is typically presented with a ranking of thousands of search results—
displayed in a sequence of web-pages each containing a few dozen products—even though she is
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unlikely to go beyond the first page (clavisinsight.com 2015). Consequently, the success of a product
crucially depends on its position in the ranking. Cognizant of such position effects, online platforms
tend to rank more popular products higher (i.e., make them more visible). However, because the
popularity of products is a priori unknown, the platform seeks to learn them through the same
process, i.e., by presenting a ranked assortment of products to users and getting feedback from
them. Such an online, real-time learning process opens the possibility of manipulations in the race
for visibility: “click farms” have emerged in which firms employ fake users who would click on
designated products in the hope of boosting their popularity and thus misleading the platform
to rank them in top positions (WSJ 2018). It has been reported that some Amazon sellers pay
$10,000 a month to “black hat” companies in order to be ranked in top positions (BuzzFeed 2019).
The emergence and prevalence of such fraudulent behavior raises the following key question: can
an online platform efficiently learn the optimal product ranking in the presence of fake users?
We pursue this question in the context of an online platform that presents each arriving customer
with a fixed set of products, displayed in a particular order1. (a ranking). Customers examine the
products sequentially until they identify and click on the desired product, exhibiting position bias
as they are more likely to only view products in top ranks. The platform then seeks to learn product
preferences from click feedback in order to refine its ranking for future customers. However, it faces
the threat of manipulation from fake users. In particular, F out of the T customers who visit the
platform constitute ‘fake users’; such users may strategically click on certain products in order to
boost their position or withhold clicks to achieve the opposite effect. Crucially, the platform is
not aware of the identity of these fake users and cannot simply ignore their feedback. Therefore,
their actions can distort the platform’s perception of product popularity, and lead to downstream
consequences for real customers who may see undesirable products at top positions. In the face of
these challenges, developing learning algorithms that are robust to fake users is clearly a priority.
Yet, despite the growing body of work on online learning and product ranking (see the related
work section), we lack a comprehensive understanding of how to develop learning algorithms that
are resilient to fake users and whether existing algorithms satisfy this criterion.
Summary of Contributions. In this work, we follow a regret analysis framework and assess
the performance of learning algorithms by proving worst-case guarantees parameterized by the
number of fake users F , which we refer to as the fakeness budget. Given the above model, we show
the following results.
1. We show that commonly used learning algorithms for product ranking are vulnerable to fake
users in that their regret can be ΩpT q, even when the number of fake users is small.
2. For the setting where the fakeness budget F is known to the platform, we design a deterministic
online algorithm called Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) whose worst-case regret is OplogpT q`F q.
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3. For a more challenging setting where the fakeness budget is unknown to the platform, we design a
randomized online algorithm called Fake-Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning (FORC) whose
worst-case regret is OpF logpT qq.
4. Finally, we carry out a numerical study using synthetic data that illustrates the superior per-
formance of FORC even though the algorithm is unaware of the fakeness budget.
All together, our results show that an online platform can effectively combat fake users with-
out incurring too much cost by employing learning algorithms that are robust to such fraudulent
behavior. In the rest of this introduction, we provide a more formal overview of our setting and the
high-level ideas of our algorithms.
We study the ranking problem faced by an online platform by adapting the well-studied stochastic
cascading bandits model (Kveton et al. 2015, Lattimore et al. 2018) to a setting with position
effects and fake users. In particular, the platform displays n products to sequentially arriving
customers. Each product has a click probability which is a priori unknown to the platform. To
capture the behavior of real customers when faced with a ranking of products, we follow the cascade
model (Craswell et al. 2008) under which a customer sequentially examines products from the
top position, in increasing order of rank. After examining each product, the customer clicks on it
with the product’s click probability and conditional on clicking, she stops. Customers who do not
click on the product at a certain position either exit the platform (with a position-specific exit
probability) or proceed to examine the product placed in the next position. This process ends when
the customer stops, exits, or reaches the end of the ranking. Each time a (real) customer clicks
on a product, the platform earns a fixed reward, which we normalize to one. As for fake users,
they may arrive at any point during the time horizon, and strategically click on specific products
(or withhold clicks) to fulfill some unknown objective; we make no assumption on their behavior.
Finally, we reiterate that the platform cannot distinguish between real customers and fake users.
Faced with such a customer population and reward structure, the platform’s aim is to learn the
ordering of the products that corresponds to customers’ preferences, namely, which product has
the largest click probability, second largest, and so on. For real customers, such an ordering is the
optimal ranking, as it maximizes the number of customers who click on products, which coincides
with the platform’s reward. Given this objective, the platform measures the performance of an
online learning algorithm by its expected cumulative regret, which is the gap between the reward
of the optimal ranking and that of the algorithm (see Equation (2) and its related discussion in
Section 3). In the presence of fake users, however, it is not hard to see that the regret of any learning
algorithm would depend on the number of fake users, and the exact nature of the fraudulent
behavior adopted by such users. Given that fake users’ strategies may be arbitrarily sophisticated
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and hard to quantify, we follow an adversarial model and pursue the goal of developing online
algorithms with small worst-case regret that depends only on the fakeness budget F , i.e., the
guarantees hold regardless of the strategy adopted by the fake users.
Failure of Traditional Learning-To-Rank Algorithms. We remark that even without fake
users, the learning problem that we study is challenging as it deviates from a standard multi-armed
bandit setting because of its combinatorial nature: each ranking can be viewed as one arm implying
that the number of arms would be exponential in n. While prior work (e.g., Kveton et al. (2015),
Lattimore et al. (2018)) overcomes this challenge by generalizing the ideas in Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) algorithms, we show that in the presence of fake users, such UCB-type algorithms
could lead to poor performance. Specifically, in Theorem 1, we prove that generalizations of UCB
for the ranking problem have worst-case regret that degrades linearly with the length of the time
horizon T (i.e. ΩpT q) even when the number of fake users is only Oplog2pT qq.
Theorem 1 also provides insights on why traditional algorithms are vulnerable to manipulation
even for simple instances with just two products. For the sake of illustration, consider two products
(one and two) with product one having a higher click probability, and suppose that real customers
only examine the top ranked product before exiting. The optimal ranking for this instance clearly
involves placing product one at the top position. Consider fake users who arrive in the early rounds
with the intention of promoting product two over product one (e.g., such users could be hired by
the sellers of product two). We show that it is possible for these fake users to adopt actions that
mislead the learning algorithm to overestimate (underestimate) the reward of the inferior (superior)
product. Consequently, the algorithm would converge to a sub-optimal ranking that places product
two at the top rank; the algorithm is unable to correct its estimates by incorporating more feedback
as real customers ignore the lower ranked product. Upon convergence, the same ranking is repeated
for future customers, leading to a regret of ΩpT q. Intuitively, our analysis shows that the lack of
robustness of such algorithms stems from two key factors: (1) the reliance of the algorithm on
the estimates formed in early rounds, and (2) the sequential nature of customers’ search behavior
which makes receiving feedback on lower ranked products more difficult.
In light of the aforementioned result, we develop novel online algorithms that learn the optimal
ranking despite manipulation by fake users. Based on the platform’s knowledge of the fakeness
budget, we design two different algorithms: (i) Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) algorithm for settings
where the platform can assess the fakeness budget F (for example, based on customer-level his-
torical data) and (ii) Fake-Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning (FORC) algorithm for settings
where the platform is unable to estimate F .
Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) Algorithm. Recall that the platform’s learning goal is to
determine the optimal ordering of products based on their click probabilities, in the presence of
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fake users. In order to achieve this, the ranking algorithm that we design (FAR), tracks the pairwise
relationships between products using a directed graph that we call the product-ordering graph.
Formally, the nodes of this graph correspond to the n products, and a directed edge from product
j to i indicates that with high probability (based on customer actions), product i has a larger
click probability than product j. The key idea behind this method involves leveraging the pairwise
product comparisons, and knowledge of the fakeness budget F by enlarging the confidence intervals
associated with each product to add edges in a conservative fashion. In particular, the extra width
of the confidence intervals is proportional to the fakeness budget F , and is carefully chosen to
compensate for any overestimation (or underestimation) caused by the actions of the fake users.
Moreover, the product-ordering graph plays a crucial role in constructing partially optimal rank-
ings based on incomplete feedback at any given point in time. That is, once we determine that
product i has a higher click probability compared to product j, product i is ranked ahead of prod-
uct j in all future rounds irrespective of its exact position. Incorporating partial feedback of this
form into the final ranking is essential to guarantee low regret. We analyze the worst-case regret2.
of the FAR algorithm in Section 5 and show it is on the order of OplogpT q`F q; see Theorem 2.
Fake-Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning (FORC) Algorithm. Our central contri-
bution in this work is a novel algorithm for learning product rankings even when the platform is
unaware of the fakeness budget F , and thus, cannot simply widen the confidence intervals propor-
tionally. Instead FORC builds on the ideas in Lykouris et al. (2018) as well as the FAR algorithm,
and uses a multi-level randomized scheme in order to distribute the damage caused by fake users
across L fi log2pT q learning levels3. running in parallel. Specifically, each level contains its own
product-ordering graph similar to its counterpart in FAR, and the probability of sampling a level
follows a geometric distribution, i.e., level 1ď `ďL is chosen with probability proportional to 2´`
in each round. Therefore, higher levels are exposed to fewer fake users and accurately infer pairwise
product relationships but also learn conservatively due to a lower sampling frequency whereas the
opposite is true for lower levels, which incur larger regret. In light of this trade-off, the crucial
ingredient that binds the algorithm together and controls regret is the notion of bi-directional
cross-learning between levels, which we employ as follows:
1. Any pairwise product relationship that is inferred at (say) level ` is immediately transferred
to all lower levels (`1 ă `). Intuitively, since higher levels are exposed to fewer fake users, this
downward cross-learning allows us to effectively utilize the accurate relationships inferred at
these levels.
2. However, downward cross-learning alone is not sufficient to limit the regret incurred in lower
levels because the accurate edges can be added too late due to the low frequency of sampling
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higher levels. We therefore complement this via a novel upward cross-learning mechanism,
wherein customer feedback collected at level ` is partially used for product comparisons at
levels `1 ą `—this enables the higher levels to rapidly infer accurate relationships.
In summary, bi-directional cross-learning between layers allow them to coordinate effectively,
leading to a worst-case regret of OpF logpT qq; see Theorem 3 in Section 6. Our analysis builds on
the ideas used in FAR to ensure that all product relationships inferred at levels ` ě log2pF q are
correct, and thus the regret of those levels can be bounded similarly. For levels lower than log2pF q,
we exploit cross-learning to bound the regret incurred due to the actions of fake users.
Numerical Studies. Finally, in Section 7, we complement our theoretical work with numeri-
cal simulations using synthetic data. Our numerical results show the non-robustness of UCB-like
algorithms under manipulation, even in real-world inspired settings that are much more general
than the simple example in Theorem 1. Our results further show that FORC outperforms FAR
despite its informational disadvantage (with regard to the fakeness budget F ), highlighting the
power of randomization and multi-level learning to combat fake users (see Figure 3 and its related
discussion).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In
Section 3, we introduce our model and the platform’s online ranking problem. Then, we formalize
the fake users’ strategy space, as well as the measure of regret. Next, we illustrate the fragility
of UCB in Section 4 by presenting a lower bound on its regret. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to
describing and analyzing our two new algorithms, respectively, FAR and FORC. Section 7 presents
our complementary numerical studies, and Section 8 concludes the paper. For the sake of brevity,
we only include proof ideas in the main text. The detailed proofs of all statements are provided in
appendices.
2. Related Work
Our work contributes to several streams of research within the online decision-making literature,
which we compare and contrast below.
Learning with Corrupted Data. The problem of designing learning algorithms that are robust to
corruption has received significant interest in the last few years (Lykouris et al. 2018, Jun et al.
2018, Gupta et al. 2019, Chen et al. 2019, Lykouris et al. 2019, 2020). This line of work was initiated
by Lykouris et al. (2018), who studied a multi-armed bandit problem with the input sequence of
samples being a mixture of stochastic and adversarial (i.e., corrupted) components. Our treatment
of fake users in this paper mirrors the notion of corrupted samples in the works mentioned above.
Broadly speaking, our model generalizes much of this literature (with the notable exception
of Chen et al. (2019)) due to the combinatorial nature of the product ranking problem. Although our
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algorithms build on some of the ideas in Lykouris et al. (2018), including enlarging the confidence
intervals and multi-level learning, the subtle differences between the two models necessitate a
fundamentally different approach. First, directly applying the algorithms from Lykouris et al. (2018)
in infeasible in our setting as the exponential number of arms, i.e., possible rankings, would lead to
a protracted learning phase. Furthermore, one cannot employ the Active Arm-Elimination method
in Lykouris et al. (2018) as the sequential nature of the consumer search model precludes eliminating
products. In fact, to obtain good guarantees for this problem, it is important to dynamically
maintain a relative ordering of products, which we do using product-ordering graphs.
Perhaps the most important difference between the two settings stems from the nature of the
feedback that the learning algorithm receives, particularly: (a) a fake click on a product at (say)
position j also influences the empirical reward on the products in the first j´ 1 positions, and (b)
unlike a typical bandit problem, the algorithm cannot control which products it receives feedback
on (beyond the first position) since customers’ exit position is random. Due to the latter limitation,
any learning algorithm for this setting could take an inordinate amount of time to achieve a
course correction after manipulation by fake users. Moreover, this limitation can lead to a lack of
coordination between multiple learning levels, which we overcome by having strong cross-learning.
Finally, we remark that the differences outlined above are also applicable for some of the other
works in this literature including Jun et al. (2018), Gupta et al. (2019), Lykouris et al. (2020).
Another related paper in this literature is the work of Chen et al. (2019), who study the problem
of designing learning algorithms for assortment planning that are robust to corruption. Similar to
Lykouris et al. (2018), the authors use the Active Arm-Elimination technique to eliminate products
that are not in the optimal assortment with high probability. As stated earlier, in our setting,
we cannot use this technique. Furthermore, unlike our setting that deals with position bias and
random feedback counts, learning algorithms for assortment planning obtain feedback for every
product offered in the assortment, which aids their design and analysis.
Learning under Non-Stationary Environments. Another line of research that is related to our
work pertains to multi-armed bandits under non-stationary environments (Besbes et al. 2014, 2015,
Karnin and Anava 2016, Keskin and Zeevi 2017, Luo et al. 2017, Cheung et al. 2019, Li and de Rijke
2019). In this line of work, pioneered by Besbes et al. (2014, 2015), the reward functions evolve over
time, but the total change in the reward function across the time horizon is bounded. Therefore,
while the above papers focus on designing learning policies that track a “moving target”, our work
and more generally, the literature on learning with corruption deals with a stationary target that
can be abruptly but temporarily displaced by fake users.
Within this literature on learning under non-stationary environments, the work that is positioned
closest to ours is that of Keskin and Zeevi (2017), who study a dynamic pricing problem where
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customer demand evolves in one of two ways: (a) gradual drifts and (b) bursty and big changes.
For these two settings, Keskin and Zeevi (2017) obtain reget bounds in the order of OpT 2{3B1{3q
and Op?T logpT qq, respectively, where B is the total variation budget. Arguably, non-stationary
environments with bursty, adversarial changes are somewhat analogous to our setting since we
can model the actions taken by fake users as changes in the underlying environment. However,
one cannot simply adapt the results in that work to design learning algorithms for our ranking
problem owing to some key differences, namely: (a) unlike the setting in Keskin and Zeevi (2017),
we have the additional challenge of dealing with a combinatorial environment; (b) the results in
that paper for bursty changes only hold when the changes are large enough, allowing the algorithm
to detect them. Such an assumption does not necessarily hold in our setting with fake users;
(c) even if we ignore the requirement of having big changes, Keskin and Zeevi (2017) present
an algorithm with a Op?T logpT qq regret guarantee. Yet, their work does not yield insights on
whether learning algorithms can yield OplogpT qq gap-dependent bounds. We achieve these much-
improved guarantees for our setting by leveraging the structural properties of how fake users alter
the underlying rewards.
Incentive-aware Learning. Our work is also related to the literature on incentive-aware learning;
see, for example, Amin et al. (2013, 2014), Kanoria and Nazerzadeh (2017), Epasto et al. (2018),
Golrezaei et al. (2019a,b). In this literature, it is assumed that the data (i.e., the samples) are
generated by strategic agents and hence, prone to manipulation, i.e., differ from the underlying
ground truth. The goal here is to design learning algorithms that incentivize the strategic agents
to provide truthful feedback—i.e., to not generate corrupted data. More specifically, many of the
papers in this literature consider the problem of learning how to set reserve prices in repeated
auctions. In this scenario, the data corresponds to bids submitted by strategic bidders, and the
auctioneer seeks to incentivize these bidders to submit uncorrupted (truthful) bids in order to learn
the optimal reserve prices. We note that our work deviates from this line of research as we do
not aim to incentivize the fake users to generate truthful data in the form of clicks. Instead, our
objective is to learn the optimal ranking despite the presence of fake users.
Robust Online Decision-making. Beyond learning, the problem of designing robust algorithms has
been studied in the online decision making literatue, particularly in the case of resource allocation
problems (Mahdian et al. 2007, Golrezaei et al. 2014, Esfandiari et al. 2015, Hwang et al. 2018,
Bradac et al. 2019). Similar to our work, these papers study settings where the arrival sequence
deviates from a stochastic process. They highlight the vulnerability of online algorithms designed
for stochastic arrival and develop robust algorithms that effectively take into account the presence
of an adversarial or a corrupted component; however, these works do not involve any learning.
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Product Ranking. Recently, many papers have designed algorithms for product ranking (or dis-
play) that account for the impact of position bias on customer choice (Davis et al. 2013, Abeliuk
et al. 2015, Aouad and Segev 2020, Abeliuk et al. 2016, Gallego et al. 2016, Lei et al. 2018, Der-
akhshan et al. 2018, Asadpour et al. 2020). In contrast to our setting, the aforementioned works
focus on the offline version of the product ranking problem, where the platform is aware of all
the parameters that make up the customers’ choice model (e.g., click probabilities). Our work is
more closely aligned to the handful of papers in this domain that study the ranking problem in
an online learning setting, i.e., the platform’s goal is to learn the parameters of the customers’
choice model and optimize its ranking decisions at the same time. In particular, while Kveton
et al. (2015), Lattimore et al. (2018), Ferreira et al. (2019) study this problem in purely stochastic
settings without fake users, Niazadeh et al. (2020) develop policies for adversarial settings, using
Blackwell Approachability (Blackwell 1956),
Closest to our work in terms of the techniques used is Lattimore et al. (2018), which presents a
learning algorithm called TopRank for the product ranking problem. This algorithm constructs a
directed acyclic graph analogous to our product-ordering graph to encode the pairwise relationships
between products and make ranking decisions. However, there is a key difference between our
ranking algorithms and TopRank: given equivalent products in the product-ordering graph, our
methods prioritize those which have recieved the smallest amount of feedback from customers so
far, whereas TopRank places them in a uniformly random order. This subtle change is crucial
in bounding the regret of our algorithms as it enables us to rapidly learn about under-sampled
products. Moreover, our FORC algorithm also relies on multi-level learning, which is not a feature
of TopRank. Finally, while Lattimore et al. (2018) consider the product ranking challenge in a
purely stochastic setting, our work is the first to study this problem in a setting with a mixture
of stochastic and adversarial components via the introduction of fake users. As stated earlier, this
setting is inspired by the visibility race on online platforms that can motivate sellers to trick (e.g.,
via fake clicks) the platforms’ ranking algorithms to secure better positions in the search results.
Sequential Search Models. When it comes to modeling customer choice in the presence of position
bias, sequential search models are prominently employed. In such models, pioneered by Weitzman
(1979), products are examined one by one starting with the first rank. One of the most widely
used sequential search models—which we also adopt in the current work—is the cascade model,
first introduced by Craswell et al. (2008). We note that other works such as Kveton et al. (2015),
Lattimore et al. (2018), Cao et al. (2019), Wang and Tulabandhula (2020) also consider a similar
cascade model, albeit without fake users. Furthermore, this model has also been used for studying
position auctions (e.g., Varian (2007), Kempe and Mahdian (2008), Athey and Ellison (2011), Chu
et al. (2020)), and dynamic pricing (e.g., Gao et al. (2018), Najafi et al. (2019)).
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3. Model
Consider an online platform which displays n products with labels in rns “ t1,2, . . . , nu. Each
product i P rns has a click probability of µi, measuring its relevance or quality. Click probabilities
are initially unknown to the platform. Without loss of generality, we assume that products are
indexed such that4.
µ1 ą µ2 ą . . .ą µn. (1)
For each arriving customer, the platform displays these n products in the form of a ranking
pi over n positions. Here, pipjq “ i implies that product i is placed in position j, where positions
with smaller indices have more visibility. Similarly, pi´1piq denotes the position of product i under
ranking pi. We informally refer to product j (respectively position j) as being better than product
i (respectively position i) when µj ą µi (respectively j ă i).
Customers’ Search Model. We divide the customers into two categories: real and fake. First,
we describe the search behavior of a real customer. Facing a ranking pi, we assume that the customer
sequentially examines products starting from the product in the top position, going downward. At
any stage, if she finds an acceptable product, she stops and clicks on it. Otherwise, she either leaves
the platform or proceeds to examine the product in the next position. Our modeling framework
falls into the category of cascade models. Such models have been extensively studied in the context
of online platforms in a variety of applications such as position auctions in sponsored search (e.g.,
Aggarwal et al. (2008), Craswell et al. (2008), and Kempe and Mahdian (2008)), online retail (e.g.,
Cao et al. (2019) and Najafi et al. (2019)), and web search (e.g., Craswell et al. (2008) and Kveton
et al. (2015)). Cascade models provide tractable frameworks to capture the impact of position on
customer choice and, particularly, the impact of the externality that products in higher (better)
positions impose on those in lower (worse) positions.
Formally, under our model, a real customer facing ranking pi begins by examining the product
in the first position, i.e., pip1q. She finds product pip1q acceptable independently with probability
µpip1q. In that case, she clicks on it, stops her search, and leaves the platform. On the other hand,
with probability 1´ µpip1q she finds this product unacceptable. In that case, she either stops and
leaves the platform (independently with position-dependent exit probability q1), or she proceeds
to examine the product in the second position repeating the same process. Our model extends
the original formulation of cascading behavior proposed by Craswell et al. (2008) by adding exit
probabilities. These position-dependent exit probabilities, i.e., tqj, j P rn´1su, capture the behavior
that customers may exit the platform if they view too many irrelevant products due to limited
attention spans or fatigue (e.g., see Cao et al. (2019), Wang and Tulabandhula (2020)).
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A fake user, however, does not follow the aforementioned search pattern and we make no par-
ticular assumptions on the actions pursued by such a user in any given round. For example, in
the case of click farms, fake users are hired to repeatedly click on a specific product in the hope
that the platform (oblivious to their existence) would boost the position of that product. More
generally, a fake user may click on any of the displayed products—regardless of the ranking and
click probabilities—creating a fake click, or she may strategically not click on any product and
even exit at an arbitrary position.
Formally, the above actions can be modeled by means of a framework where all of the fake
users are generated by a single entity. The entity is assumed to follow an adaptive policy Pt that
maps Ht´1—the history of both the platform and customers’ actions up to round pt´ 1q, formally
defined later— to the fake user’s actions in round t. The fake user’s action may be deterministic
or randomized and includes (a probability distribution over) three components:
1. whether or not the user in round t is fake,
2. if so, the identity of at most one product the fake user would click on,
3. in the absence of a click, the position at which the fake user exits (if the fake user clicks on a
product, they exit at the corresponding position to mimic real customers).
We assume that the fake user can influence the outcome of at most F rounds, which we denote
as the fakeness budget. We use P to denote the family of feasible policies that respect the fake
entity’s budget, which includes randomized policies. The generality of this framework enables us
to encompass different types of fake users including those who employ sophisticated strategies; see
Theorem 1 for a specific example. Our overall goal is to develop learning algorithms that are robust
to any arbitrary, and unknown policy adopted by such an entity. In the rest of this work, we abuse
terminology and use the term fake user to refer to both the individual customers in specific rounds
as well as the overall entity that controls the adaptive policy.
Platform’s Information and Objective. We assume that a priori the platform is not aware
of the click probabilities tµi, i P rnsu and exit probabilities tqj, j P rn ´ 1su. In each round, the
platform only observes (a) which (if any) product the customer clicks on, and (b) where she exits
the platform in case she does not click on any product. Note that under our model, if the customer
clicks on the product in position j, then she exits at the same position. The latter is a mild
assumption as many platforms display products on devices with a small screen. On each page of
such a device, only a few products, if not one, are displayed. Thus, a customer needs to take some
action observable to the platform (for example, swiping) to browse more products.
The platform’s objective is to find a ranking pi‹ that maximizes customer engagement, which is
the click probability of real customers. Under the described customer search model, the optimal
ranking (for real customers) is simply ordering the products in decreasing order of their click
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probabilities tµi, i P rnsu. That is, the product with the highest click probability should be placed in
position one, and the product with the second-highest click probability should be placed in position
two, and so on. Since we indexed the products in decreasing order of their click probabilities, the
optimal ranking is characterized by pi‹piq “ i for all i P rns. Thus, the platform’s goal is to learn
this optimal ranking by observing customers’ clicks and exit positions without knowing whether
the customer is real or fake.
Online Ranking Problem. We study the platform’s ranking problem in an online setting with
T rounds, where in each round t P rT s, the platform displays the products to an arriving customer
according to ranking pit. The main challenge here stems from the platform’s lack of awareness
regarding whether the customer at round t is real or fake.
Formally, we use Cr,tppiq P t0,1u to denote the click action of a real customer who arrives in round
t when presented with a ranking pi. More specifically, Cr,tppiq “ 1 if the customer in round t is real
and clicks on a product under ranking pi; otherwise Cr,tppiq “ 0. Analogously, we define Cf,tppiq to
indicate a click from a fake customer. Observe that while Cr,tppiq is a random variable drawn from
the distribution specified by the real customers’ search model (which is initially unknown to the
platform), its value also depends on the action Pt adopted by the fake user at this round, e.g.,
whether or not the user is fake. For convenience, we use ct P ptHuYrnsqˆrns to represent the (real
or fake) user’s actions in round t, comprising of the product clicked on and the exit position, where
ct “ pH, jq implies that no product was clicked on and the customer exits after position j.
The platform earns a unit of reward in round t if Cr,tppitq “ 1—i.e., only when a real customer
engages with the platform.
The performance of any algorithm is then measured by the expected cumulative regret (or more
precisely pseudo-regret, e.g., see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012)), which is the gap between the
reward obtained by selecting the (unknown) optimal ranking during all rounds and that of the
given ranking algorithm. Let Ht “ tppi1, f1, c1q, ppi2, f2, c2q, . . . , ppit, ft, ctqu denote the entire history
up to round t, where ft1 “ 1 implies the presence of a fake user in round t1 ď t. Define Hot “
tppi1, c1q, ppi2, c2q, . . . , ppit, ctqu as the sub-history observable by the platform. The regret of an algo-
rithm ppit :Hot´1ÑΠqTt“1 is then defined as:5.
RegT “ sup
PPP
#
EHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHT ppitq
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppitq
ı+
, (2)
where the expectations are taken over HT ppi‹q and HT ppitq—the random histories of the algorithm
and customer actions when the underlying algorithms select rankings pi‹ and ppitqTt“1, respectively.
Note that the realization of the history also depends on any randomness in the policies adopted by
both the platform and the fake user, as well as the randomness stemming from the real customers’
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clicks in any given round. Further, since the adaptive policy employed by the fake users is unknown
to the platform, we seek to achieve minimal regret over all possible P “ pPtqTt“1 belonging to a
family P of feasible policies as discussed earlier.
Remark 1 (Discussion on our definition of regret.). We highlight that our regret
notion as well as the platform objective only takes into account the click actions from real cus-
tomers. This is motivated by the fact that a platform does not derive any tangible benefit from the
clicks generated by fake users. At the same time, although the actions of fake users do not directly
alter the regret in the same round, they may significantly hurt the utility derived by a platform in
future rounds by causing the platform to incorrectly estimate the click probabilities (rewards) of
various products. One could alternatively consider another notion of regret under which the fake
clicks are also counted. Such a notion of regret is considered in some previous works, e.g., Lykouris
et al. (2018). Although including fake clicks does not make sense for the application that we are
interested in, these two notions are actually very close to each other in that their difference cannot
exceed the number of fake users, denoted by F . See Appendix A for the relationship between our
definition of regret and one where fake clicks are included under any fixed policy P .
Information Settings. We design learning algorithms under two informational environments,
based on whether or not the platform can estimate the fakeness budget F . In the first setting,
the platform is aware of the fakeness budget F , whereas in the second setting, the platform does
not have this knowledge. The former scenario is motivated by the fact that online platforms may
be able to estimate the aggregate number or fraction of fake users from historical data, even if
individual users cannot be verified. For this setting, in Section 5, we design a learning algorithm,
which we refer to as the Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) Algorithm. Naturally, its regret depends on
the fakeness budget6. F .
We derive gap-dependent bounds for the regret of FAR in terms of the gaps between the products’
click probabilities defined below:
∆j,i “ µj ´µi @i, j P rns. (3)
In the case where all gaps are bounded below by a constant, we show that the expected regret
of FAR is OpF ` logpT qq (Theorem 2). For the more challenging setting where we do not know
F , we present a learning algorithm in Section 6, which we term Fake-Oblivious Ranking with
Cross-Learning (FORC). We show that the expected regret of FORC is given by O pF logpT qq; see
Theorem 3 for the gap-dependent regret bound of FORC.
Before presenting our algorithms, in the next section, we show that ignoring the existence of fake
users and simply running well-established algorithms such as the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB)
Algorithm can lead to linear regret even when the fakeness budget F is small.
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4. Non-Robustness of UCB to Fake Users
In this section, we argue that existing stochastic bandit algorithms for product ranking—such
as CascadeUCB (Kveton et al. 2015) and its variants—are not naturally robust to fake users. In
particular, we will show that there are instances of our problem with F “Oplog2pT qq fake users,
for which these algorithms never converge to the optimal ranking, and incur regret that is linear
in T (whereas the regret bounds for FAR and FORC are sublinear and given by Theorems 2 and 3
respectively).
To show this result, we construct a simple two product instance of our ranking problem which
ignores its combinatorial aspect so that computing a ranking becomes equivalent to selecting a
single product for the top position. The problem of learning product rankings then reduces to
a simple multi-armed bandit problem, and therefore, any combinatorial generalization of UCB
such as CascadeUCB (Kveton et al. 2015) would also reduce to the standard UCB algorithm (e.g.,
see Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012)). Leveraging this equivalence, the following theorem demon-
strates that the UCB algorithm is not robust to fake clicks.
Theorem 1 (Non-Robustness of UCB to Fake Users). There exists an instance of the
product ranking problem with two products and sequence of F “Oplog2pT qq fake users which causes
the UCB algorithm to incur ΩpT q regret.
(Proof Sketch). In order to show Theorem 1, we consider an instance with two products, where
µ1 “ 1 and µ2 “ 12 . In this instance, the exit probability is given by q1 “ 1; that is, real customers
stop their search after examining the product in the first position, and never examine the product
in the second position. Since the number of products is two, there are only two possible rankings,
namely p1,2q and p2,1q, where in ranking pi, jq product i is placed in the first position and product
j is placed in the second position. Therefore, selecting a ranking pi, jq is equivalent to picking a
product i for the top position. Given this reasoning, it is not hard to see that generalizations of UCB
for the ranking problem such as CascadeUCB (Kveton et al. 2015) or PBM-UCB (Lagre´e et al. 2016)
would simply reduce to the UCB algorithm for a standard multi-armed bandit problem. Recall that
this algorithm maintains an estimate of the reward (click probability) for each arm (product) and
selects the arm in each round with the highest upper confidence bound on its empirical reward.
Following this simplification, we now construct a strategy for the fake users under which the
UCB algorithm does not learn the optimal ranking p1,2q, i.e., it does not select product one for the
top position. To comprehend the motivation behind the this strategy, it is important to understand
that UCB is significantly more robust to overestimations of rewards than underestimations. For
example, while it might be tempting to implement a strategy which simply uses the fake users to
click on the sub-optimal product (raising UCB’s estimate of its mean), this alone does not suffice.
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Once the fake clicks subside, UCB will continue to collect samples from this product by placing
it in the top position, and quickly readjust its estimate of this product’s mean. On the other
hand, causing UCB to underestimate a product’s mean reward can be devastating: once the upper
confidence bound of a product falls below the other product’s mean, with high probability, UCB
will never select this product again! For this reason, instead of using the fake users to exclusively
boost product two’s estimated reward, we also require them to worsen product one’s empirical
reward to such an extent that UCB will never select it for the remainder of the algorithm.
We now describe the fake user’s strategy, which is depicted in Figure 1. The strategy has three
phases. In the first phase, which has a duration of 2 log2pT q rounds, the fake user does not click
on any product regardless of what ranking is presented. In the second phase, which again has a
duration of 2 log2pT q rounds, the fake user clicks on product two when it is present in the top
position but never clicks on product one. In the remaining rounds, which constitute the third phase,
there are no fake users.
Second 2 log2(&) rounds Rest of rounds First 2 log2(&) rounds 
Fake user: no clicks Fake user: only clicks on 
product 2 if ranking (2,1)
is shown 
Real customers (no fake users ) t 
Figure 1 The fake user’s strategy in Theorem 1.
At the conclusion of the second phase, the upper confidence bound of product two is almost
certainly significantly larger than that of product one; so the UCB algorithm will select ranking
p2,1q over p1,2q for the remaining customers. Further, due to the absence of clicks in the first stage,
the empirical mean of the click probabilities of both products at the beginning of the third stage
will be smaller than their true rewards. Therefore, as the UCB algorithm selects ranking p2,1q for
the real customers, the estimated reward for product two cannot decrease. However, given that
ranking p2,1q is sub-optimal, this leads to linear regret in the remaining rounds.
Finally, we conclude by noting that although we only characterized the underperformance of
UCB for a simple, two-product instance, the same behavior and poor regret are also applicable
for much more general instances, which we highlight in Section 7. The fact that one of the most
well-studied algorithms in the online learning literature can be tricked into learning a sub-optimal
ranking motivates us to design new methods that are more robust to fake users.
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5. Known Fakeness Budget: Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) Algorithm
In this section, we present our Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR) Algorithm for the setting where the
platform knows the fakeness budget F . The design of the algorithm, which is presented in Algorithm
1, is based on the crucial observation that the platform does not necessarily need to estimate
the click probabilities tµi, i P rnsu (nor the exit probabilities) to identify the optimal ranking pi‹;
instead, it suffices to correctly determine for every pair of products pi, jq, whether µi is greater
than µj. In light of this observation, our algorithm keeps track of a product-ordering (directed)
graph G, where every node of this graph represents a product and a directed edge from node i to
node j (i.e., edge pi, jq) implies that product j dominates product i in the sense that µj ą µi. We
now describe the various features of FAR, and in the process, provide an informal description of
Algorithm 1.
Product-Ordering Graph. Initially, the product-ordering graph G does not have any edges.
Gradually, as our algorithm collects more feedback on customers’ preferences for various products,
we can infer pairwise relationships with more certainty. Eventually, the algorithm adds an edge
pi, jq to graph G in round t when the condition in (4) holds, indicating that with high probability,
the true click probability of product j pµjq is larger than that of product i pµiq.
ri`
d
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηi
` F
ηi
ď rj ´
d
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηj
´ F
ηj
. (4)
Here, ri and rj are the algorithm’s empirical estimates of the click probabilities of products i and
j respectively, and ηi, ηj denote the number of times (so far) the algorithm has received feedback on
these products, respectively. Finally, δ is a parameter, which we set in Step 3 of Algorithm 1. For
any given product i P rns, we say that the algorithm receives feedback on this product in round t, if
the customer stops her search in position j and pi´1t piq ď j; that is, product i is placed in a position
at least as visible as j. Of course, such feedback is only credible if the customer is real. However,
the algorithm cannot distinguish between real and fake users, and as a result, ηi is increased by one
(in Step 6 of Algorithm 1) after every round in which we receive feedback on product i. Similarly,
ri is also updated (in Step 6 of Algorithm 1) when we receive feedback on product i P rns—i.e., if
the algorithm has received feedback ηi times on product i, and k out of these ηi customers clicked
on the product, then ri “ k{ηi.
The term
b
logp 2nTδ q
ηi
` F
ηi
in Equation (4) can be viewed as a “fakeness-robust” upper confidence
interval for the estimate ri of µi. This quantity depends on the fakeness budget F , which represents
the fact that the algorithm does not fully trust its estimate of the µi due to the presence of fake
users. Given that there are at most F fake users, the term F
ηi
captures the maximum amount by
which these fake users can distort our empirical estimate of product i’s reward after ηi rounds of
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feedback. Therefore, according to Equation (4), the algorithm adds the edge pi, jq to graph G when
our upper bound on the reward of product i, i.e., ri `
b
logp 2nTδ q
ηi
` F
ηi
, is smaller than our lower
bound on that of product j, i.e., rj´
c
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηj
´ F
ηj
. In simple terms, even our worst-case estimate
of the click probability of product j is larger than our best-case estimate for that of product i.
Algorithm 1 Known Fakeness Budget: Fake-Aware Ranking (FAR)
1: Input: The fakeness budget F and number of rounds T .
2: Output: For each round t P rT s, a ranking pit.
3: Initialization. Let δ “ 1
nT
. For all i P rns, initialize the average rewards riÐ 0 and feedback
counts ηiÐ 0. Further, initialize the product-ordering graph GÐprns,Hq.
4: for t“ 1, . . . , T , do
5: Ranking Decision. Display the products according to ranking pit “ GraphRankSe-
lect(η,G), and observe ct P ptHu Y rnsq ˆ rns (i.e., the clicked product and last browsed
position).
6: Update Variables. Let j be the last position that the customer examined. Increment the
feedback counts ηi for every i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpjqu, by one. Then, for all i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpj´1qu,
update the average rewards as riÐ ripηi´1qηi . For i“ pitpjq, if the customer clicked on i, update
riÐ ripηi´1q`1ηi , otherwise riÐ
ripηi´1q
ηi
.
7: Add Edges to Graph G. For each i, j P rns with ηi, ηj ą 0 such that
ri`
d
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηi
` F
ηi
ď rj ´
d
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηj
´ F
ηj
,
add a directed edge pi, jq to G.
8: end for
Ranking Decision. The FAR algorithm chooses its ranking pit in round t via theGraphRankS-
elect(η,G) function, defined in Algorithm 2. In particular, this function uses the product-ordering
graph G and feedback counts η to output a ranking that a corresponds to a topological ordering of
graph G, breaking ties in favor of products with a low feedback count. Concretely, GraphRankS-
elect(η,G) assigns products to ranks sequentially starting with the top position. In each step, it
selects a product that has no outgoing edge in G to any other product; if multiple products meet
this criterion, then the product with the smallest of ηi is selected. Following this, we update the
graph by removing this product and its edges, and then repeat the selection process for the next
position. Roughly speaking, our selection algorithm balances exploitation with exploration—(a)
products without outgoing edges are placed at better positions as they are at least as good as
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4,2,3,1,5,6
6 !, = 10
Figure 2 By applying function GraphRankSelectpη,Gq to this instance, we obtain ranking p4,2,1,3,5,6q. Here,
η“ p20,15,15,10,1,10q.
the remaining products, thereby exploiting prior feedback; and (b) ties are broken in a manner
that ensures we collect more information on products with low feedback counts, leading to more
exploration. We remark that any deletion of edges inside the GraphRankSelect(η,G) function
do not alter the product-ordering graph outside of it. Finally, we note that the function returns
an arbitrary ranking when graph G has a cycle, which is indicative of contradictory information
regarding pairwise product relationships. Nevertheless, as we show in Lemma 3, the probability
that graph G contains a cycle is very small.
Example 1. In Figure 2, we illustrate via a toy example how the function GraphRankSe-
lect(η,G) chooses a ranking for a given product-ordering graph G and feedback counts η. In this
example, there are n“ 6 products, and as shown in Figure 2, both products two and four do not
have any outgoing edges. Then, function GraphRankSelect(η,G) places these two products in
the first two positions. However, since η4 ă η2, the algorithm prioritizes product four over product
two by placing it in the first position. After removing products two and four and their associated
edges from graph G, product one is the only product with no outgoing edge, and as a result, is
placed in position three. Continuing this process leads to ranking p4,2,1,3,5,6q.
Having described the FAR algorithm, in the following theorem, we characterize its regret.
Theorem 2 (Known Fakeness Budget: Regret of FAR Algorithm). Let F be the fake-
ness budget and assume that F is known to the platform. Then, the expected regret of the FAR
algorithm satisfies
RegT “O
˜
n2F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
logpnT q
∆j,i
¸
. (5)
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 2, we highlight two key ideas: (a) The threshold
for adding a directed edge between products i and j (presented in Equation (4)) is set such that,
with high probability, the product-ordering graph never contains an erroneous edge, even in the
presence of fake users; (b) The GraphRankSelect(η,G) function (Algorithm 2), when deciding
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Algorithm 2 Function GraphRankSelect for Ranking Decision
1: Input. Product-ordering graph G and feedback count η“ pη1, η2, . . . , ηnq.
2: Output. Ranking pi.
3: function GraphRankSelect(η,G)
4: Set S “ rns and Gˆ“G.
5: If graph G has a cycle, then return an arbitrary ranking pi. (In the analysis of the
FAR algorithm, we show that this is a rare event.)
6: Else, for j “ 1, . . . , n do
7: Let i be a product in S that has no outgoing edges to S in graph Gˆ. If multiple products
in S satisfy this condition, choose the one with smallest ηi value.
8: Place product i in position j, i.e., pipjq “ i.
9: Remove i from set S, i.e., SÐ Sztiu; remove node i and all of its incoming edges from
graph Gˆ.
10: end for
11: end function
on which product to place in a given position, prioritizes the least explored product (among those
with no outgoing edges). As a result, any product i that is worse than another product j cannot
be placed in a position more visible than that of j “too many” times as its feedback count would
rapidly exceed that of product j.
Proof of Theorem 2. Recall that pi‹ is the optimal ranking and pit is the ranking selected by our
learning algorithm in round t. Fix some arbitrary policy P “ pPtqtPrT s P P for the fake user. Our
goal is to show that for any choice of P , the regret RegT pP q incurred by our learning algorithm
belongs to O
´
n2F `řnj“1 řni“j`1 logpnT q∆j,i ¯. Note that by Equation (2), the regret RegT pP q can be
written in the form:
RegT pP q “ EHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHT ppitq
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppitq
ı
, (6)
where the histories HT ppi‹q and HT ppitq depend on the policy P , the randomness in the customer’s
actions in each round, and the ranking algorithm itself. When it is clear from context, we omit the
history over which the expectation is taken.
Our proof now proceeds as follows. First, in Lemma 1, we decompose the regret into terms
corresponding to the loss resulting from misplacing any inferior product at a given position j for
all j P rns. Then, in Lemma 2, we show that with high probability, the algorithm’s empirical means
for the click probability of each product are close to the actual click probabilities. Following this,
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in Lemmas 3 and 4, we provide an upper bound for the number of times that an inferior product
is misplaced in position j P rns. The proofs for all of these lemmas are deferred to Appendix C.
We begin by decomposing the regret into a sum of “pairwise regrets” for each pair of products
across the entire time horizon.
Lemma 1 (Decomposing Regret). The regret of an algorithm ppitqTt“1 compared to the optimal
ranking pi‹ satisfies
E
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´E
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppitq
ı
ď F `
Tÿ
t“1
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,iEHtppitq
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
‰
, (7)
where Ar,tppitpjq “ iq denotes the event where: (a) product i is placed in position j under pit, i.e.,
pitpjq “ i, (b) the customer in round t is real, and (c) we receive feedback on product i (that is, the
customer does not exit before position j).
Looking at the right hand side of Equation (7), it is tempting to conclude that the only impact of
the fake users on regret is the additive term F . However, this is inaccurate as the realization of the
random variable7. IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq depends on pit, which in turn crucially depends on the fake
user’s actions in rounds prior to t. For example, the products boosted by a fake user (via clicks)
in previous rounds may be perceived as high quality products and be ranked in the top positions
under pit. In the remainder of this proof, we will focus on bounding the deleterious effects of fake
users on future regret.
Following Equation (7), consider the term E rIpAr,tppitpjq “ iqqs, which represents the event that
product i is placed in a position j that is better than its position in the optimal ranking pi‹ (i.e.,
ią jq, and a real customer examines product i. In particular, such a product placement is clearly
sub-optimal compared to the optimal ranking and could potentially contribute to the regret; so we
seek to bound the number of times this sub-optimal event occurs.
In order to analyze E rIpAr,tppitpjq “ iqqs, we first condition it on the event that in every round
t P rT s, the true click probability µi of any product i P rns, is within an appropriate confidence
interval around its empirical mean. More precisely, for any t P rT s, and product i P rns, we extend
our notation from Algorithm 1 and use ηi,t to denote the number of times we receive feedback on
product i up to round t, and ri,t to denote the average reward we have observed for product i until
round t. For any product i P rns and round t P rT s, define the random event
Ei,t fi tri,t´wi,t ď µi ď ri,t`wi,tu , (8)
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where for each t P rT s and i P rns, the window size (confidence interval) wi,t is defined as
wi,t fi
$’&’%
c
logp 2nTδ q
ηi,t
` F
ηi,t
if ηi,t ą 0;
max
´
1,
b
logp 2nT
δ
q`F
¯
if ηi,t “ 0 .
(9)
Under event Ei,t, the true click probability µi of product i lies within a confidence window of width
wi,t around the empirical reward ri,t, at the end of round t.
Finally, we define E “ tŞiPrns,tPrT s Ei,tu as the intersection of all the events Ei,t for every product
i P rns and round t P rT s. We show that E holds with high probability.
Lemma 2 (Concentration Inequality). The probability that the event E holds is at least 1´
δ2
nT
, where E “ tŞiPrns,tPrT s Ei,tu and Ei,t (i P rns and t P rT s) is defined in Equation (8), and δ“ 1nT .
Going back to the second term in the right hand side of Equation (7), we have that:
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
Tÿ
t“1
EHT ppitq rIpAr,tppitpjq “ iqqs “ PpEq
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
Tÿ
t“1
EHT ppitq
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇE‰
`PpEcq
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
Tÿ
t“1
EHT ppitq
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇEc‰ .
(10)
Here, the term EHT ppitq
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇE‰ restricts the expectation to (be conditional on) histories
where event E is true. We omit the subscript HT ppitq from the expectation when its meaning is
clear. From Lemma 2, note that
PpEcq ď δ
2
nT
(11)
Using this upper bound on the probability of Ec, we simplify the second term on the right hand
side of Equation (10) as follows:
PpEcq
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇEc‰ď δ2
nT
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇEc‰
ď δ
2
nT
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
Ippitpjq “ iq
ˇˇEc‰
“ δ
2
nT
nÿ
j“1
Tÿ
t“1
E
«
nÿ
i“j`1
Ippitpjq “ iq
ˇˇˇ
Ec
ff
ď δ
2
nT
nÿ
j“1
Tÿ
t“1
1“ δ2. (12)
The first inequality above follows from Equation (11) and the fact that ∆j,i ď 1. The second one is
due to the observation that IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq ď Ippitpjq “ iq because pitpjq “ i is a necessary condition
for the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq to occur. Finally, the last inequality holds because Ippitpjq “ iq is true
for at most one product ią j in round t.
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Next, we turn our attention to characterizing the loss under event E . Namely, we focus on
providing an upper bound for the expression
řT
t“1E
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇE‰ from Equation (10) for
some arbitrary i, j P rns such that i ą j. In the following, we first show that if we have enough
samples (or feedback) from both products i and j, we will not place product i at a better position
compared to product j. Then, we upper bound the number of rounds needed to ensure that we
have enough samples. To that end, for ią j, we define γj,i as:
γj,i fimax
"
64 logp2nT {δq
∆2j,i
,
8F
∆j,i
*
. (13)
Observe that for any ią j, if ηi,t ě γj,i, then wi,t ď ∆j,i4 as per our definition in Equation (9). The
same holds for product j. Therefore, if we receive enough samples from both products i and j,
under event E , the condition (4) will be satisfied. This allows our algorithm to correctly add an
edge pi, jq to the product-ordering graph G. The following lemma formalizes the above observation.
More precisely, it states that conditioned on event E , the graph G does not contain erroneous edges.
Lemma 3 (Properties of the Graph G under Event E). Assume that the event E holds.
Then, for any two products i, j with ią j:
1. In any round t, the product-ordering graph G does not contain the (incorrect) edge pj, iq.
2. Suppose that in round t, ηi,t, ηj,t ě γj,i, where γj,i is defined in (13). Then, the product-ordering
graph G contains the (correct) edge pi, jq for all rounds t1 ě t.
Lemma 3 implies that under event E , graph G does not have any erroneous edges, and when
the number of samples (feedback) collected on any two products i and j is large enough, there is a
correct edge between their corresponding nodes in the graph G. Recall that a directed edge from
product i to product j in G is indicative of the fact that product j has a higher click probability.
Our next lemma shows that, conditioned on event E , any mistake in ranking an inferior product
i ahead of product j ă i is due to lack of feedback on product i. Further, this is also true when
product i is placed at position j, a scenario whose occurrence we are seeking to bound.
Lemma 4 (Necessary Conditions for an Incorrect Ordering). Assume that event E
holds. Suppose that the function GraphRankSelect(η,G) (Algorithm 2) ranks product i at a
better position compared to product j in round t` 1 for some ią j. Then, there must exist some
product k ď j such that (a) the product-ordering graph G does not include the edge pi, kq after
round t (b) ηi,t ď ηk,t (i.e. we have less feedback on product i than on product k), and (c) ηi,t ă γk,i,
where γk,i is as defined in Equation (13).
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By utilizing Lemma 4, we will now show that for any ią j, we have řTt“1E“IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqqˇˇE‰ď
γj,i. Note that this completes the proof because by Equations (7), (10), and (12), we get
RegT pP q ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
˜
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇE‰¸` δ2
ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
j“i`1
∆j,iγj,i` δ2
ď F ` 1`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
max
"
64 logp2nT {δq
∆j,i
,8F
*
.
The final inequality comes from substituting the expression for γj,i (as given in (13)), and using
δ2 ď 1. Finally, plugging δ“ 1
nT
, we get the following expression, which leads to the theorem.
RegT pP q ď F ` 1`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
max
"
128 logp?2nT q
∆j,i
,8F
*
(14)
It remains for us to show that for any ią j, we have řTt“1E“IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqqˇˇE‰ď γj,i. Recall
that event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq is true only if (a) product i is placed in position j under ranking pit, and
(b) a real customer examines it (i.e., we receive feedback on product i)8. .
Suppose that event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq occurs. Since ią j, this implies there must exist at least one
product as good as product j that is (sub-optimally) ranked below position j—this follows from
the pigeonhole principle. Mathematically, we can write this as
pitpjq “ i; ią j ùñ Ds with sď j s.t. pi´1t psq ą j. (15)
Note that here, we identify a product s ď j which is placed below product i under ranking pit.
That is, pi´1t psq ą pi´1t piq while să i. Thus, we can apply Lemma 4 to the pair of products i and s.
Lemma 4 implies that there exists some product k better than (or equal to) s such that i has no
edge to k in graph G at round t and that ηi,t´1 ď ηk,t´1. Note that this also implies that ηi,t´1 ă γk,i;
if not, then we would have that ηi,t´1, ηk,t´1 ě γk,i. By Lemma 3, this would imply that G contains
an edge from i to k, contradicting our construction of k.
Combining this and the fact that µi ă µj ď µs ď µk, we can conclude that
ηi,t´1 ă γk,i ď γs,i ď γj,i.
We have therefore shown that conditioned on event E , if in some round t and for some i ą j,
Ar,tppitpjq “ iq holds, we must have that ηi,t´1 ă γj,i. Conditional on E , consider any arbitrary
instantiation of our algorithm, and let tj,i denote the first round at which ηi,t “ γj,i. We claim
that for any tą tj,i, our algorithm never places product i at position j since this would result in
a contradiction. To see why this would be a contradiction, assume that pitpjq “ i in some round
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tą tj,i. According to Equation (15), we can infer the existence of a product s such that să j and
pi´1t psq ą j “ pi´1t piq. Next, we invoke Lemma 4 with the pair of products i and s to conclude that
ηi,t´1 ă γs,i. However, we have γs,i ď γj,i, which is a contradiction because, by definition, ηi,t´1 ě γj,i
for any tą tj,i.
Therefore, conditional on E , we have
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇE‰“E«tj,iÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ˇˇEff
ďE
«
tj,iÿ
t“1
ηi,t´ ηi,t´1
ˇˇˇ
E
ff
“E
”
ηi,tj,i
ˇˇˇ
E
ı
“ γj,i ,
where the first and last equalities follow from the definition of tj,i, and the inequality follows from
the observation that event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq is only a sufficient condition on getting feedback on
product i in any round t. This completes our proof. ˝
Remark 2. The vanilla version of the FAR algorithm needs to know the time horizon T in order
to set its parameter δ, and the window size. However, by using the standard doubling trick (see,
e.g., Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012)), one can modify the FAR algorithm so that the algorithm
does not need to know T in advance. Instead, the algorithm starts with an initial guess value for
T , and every time, it reaches its guess, the algorithm doubles it.
6. Unknown Fakeness Budget: Fake-Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning
(FORC) Algorithm
In this section, we consider a setting where the platform does not know the fakeness budget F
in advance. We build on the ideas used in FAR to develop our second algorithm called Fake-
Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning (FORC), which is agnostic to the fakeness budget. The
formal description of FORC is presented in Algorithm 3. Here, we highlight the main ideas of the
algorithm, and provide an informal description.
Multi-Level Learning. Recall that in the FAR algorithm, we account for the presence of fake
users by widening the confidence intervals used to determine the superiority of one product over
another, by an additive factor proportional to F ; see Equation (4). Since we do not know the
value of F in this case, we cannot simply widen the confidence interval. Instead, we use a multi-
level randomized algorithm that at each step, selects one of L“ log2pT q sub-algorithms running in
parallel, with different probabilities. More precisely, in each round t P rT s, (the learning algorithm
corresponding to) level ` is selected with probability 2´` for ` P t2, . . . ,Lu, and level `“ 1 is selected
with probability 1´řL`“2 2´`. Observe that levels with higher indices are sampled with smaller
probabilities and as a result, they are exposed to a fewer number of fake users. Adopting such a
multi-level mechanism allows us to limit the damage caused by fake users to the learning algorithm
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at any one level. Leveraging this, we later provide a concrete bound on the number of fake users
that higher levels are exposed to, which serves as an “effective fakeness budget”.
As stated earlier, our idea of employing multi-level learning in FORC is inspired by the algorithm
in Lykouris et al. (2018). However, due to the randomness in our feedback structure—i.e., we cannot
predict exactly which products will be examined by the customers—coordinating these learning
levels is rather challenging, compared to the multi-armed bandit setting in Lykouris et al. (2018).
Later, we discuss how we facilitate efficient coordination between different learning levels using
careful upward and downward cross-learning across levels.
We begin by formalizing our main rationale for a multi-level scheme by establishing a bound
on the number of fake users that higher levels, i.e., those with index `ě log2pF q, are exposed to.
Specifically, the following lemma proves that with high probability any level `ě log2pF q is exposed
to OplogplogpT qqq fake users.
Lemma 5 (Effective Fakeness Budget for High Learning Levels). For any fake user pol-
icy P with fakeness budget F , with probability at least 1 ´ δ
2
, the following holds for all levels
`ě log2pF q: level ` in Algorithm 3 is exposed to at most logp2Lδ q` 3 fake users, where δ“ 1n3T and
L“ log2pT q.
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix D. Informally, the above lemma implies that
the effective fakeness budget for the `-th learning level (when ` ě log2pF q) is logp 2Lδ q ` 3, where
δ “ 1
n3T
. As such, it seems intuitive to replace F in Equation (4) (window size used in the FAR
algorithm) by this term. Based on this, we set the confidence interval for each level in Algorithm 3
to be slightly larger than logp2L
δ
q` 3 to account for this effective fakeness budget, as well as some
extra corruption that arises due to cross-learning (see Step (10) in Algorithm 3).
Product-Ordering Graphs and Cross-Learning. In the FORC algorithm, each learning
level ` is represented by a product-ordering graph Gp`q. Analogous to Algorithm 1, the edges in
the graph represent dominance relationships between pairs of products, which in turn determine
the ranking decisions when level ` is randomly selected. As a consequence of Lemma 5, one can
show using similar techniques as in the proof of FAR that levels ` ě log2pF q always converge to
the optimal ranking as their product-ordering graphs do not contain erroneous edges. However
this claim does not hold for levels `ă log2pF q, which witness more fake users, and can incur large
regret. At the same time, since the fakeness budget and hence, log2pF q, are unknown, one cannot
simply ignore these lower levels. Instead, we introduce the notion of bi-directional cross-learning—
described below—to a) transfer edges from higher levels to lower ones in order to identify which
levels contain incorrect edges , and b) speed up the learning process at higher levels.
26 Golrezaei, Manshadi, Schneider, and Sekar: Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users
• Downward Cross-Learning. In a given round, if the FORC algorithm adds an edge pi, jq to
graph Gp`q corresponding to level `, the same edge is also added to graphs Gp`
1q for all `1 ă `.
The intuition behind this downward propagation is that the higher levels are more cautious in
learning product orderings and an inference made at this level is more likely to be accurate
than one made at a lower level. Further, downward cross-learning may lead to the formation of
cycles in the product-order graphs at lower levels due to the presence of contradictory edges; we
eliminate these graphs (Step 11 of Algorithm 3) to curtail the damage caused by such edges. We
note that in any given round, if the algorithm selects a level ` such that its corresponding graph
Gp`q was previously eliminated, then we default to graph Gp`
1q for our ranking decisions, where
`1 ą ` is the smallest level whose product-ordering graph has not yet been eliminated (Step 6 of
Algorithm 3).
• Upward Cross-Learning. Simply widening the confidence intervals along with downward
cross-learning is not sufficient to ensure low regret. By the time a conservative higher level learns
accurate product orderings (e.g., i ą j), the lower levels—that are sampled more frequently—
can make too many mistakes in their ranking decisions. We control for this by incorporating an
upward cross-learning mechanism (as defined in Step 9 in Algorithm 3). In particular, the empir-
ical product rewards, e.g., rˆ
p`q
i , that determine the edges in graph G
p`q, depend on a weighted
average of the observations from the corresponding level ` and samples obtained from lower levels
`1 ă `. Using a weighted average can impact our algorithm in two ways. On one hand, they can
increase the learning rate at higher levels by including samples acquired in lower levels. On the
other hand, they can increase the number of fake users that higher levels are exposed to. We
choose the weights carefully to balance the trade-off between these two factors. We highlight that
upward cross-learning is one of the novel features of the FORC algorithm that differentiates it
from the prior work on learning with corrupted samples, including that of Lykouris et al. (2018).
We defer presenting an illustrative instance to Section 7, where we give a detailed example to
demonstrate how (i) product-ordering graphs of different levels evolve over time (in Figure 4),
(ii) downward cross-learning leads to the elimination of lower-level graphs, and (iii) upward cross-
learning expedites the formation of correct edges in higher levels. Having highlighted the main
ideas of the FORC algorithm, we now characterize its regret in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Unknown Fakeness Budget: Regret of FORC Algorithm). Let F be the
fakeness budget and assume that F is unknown to the platform. Then, the expected regret of the
FORC algorithm satisfies
RegT “O
˜`
n2F ` logpT q˘ nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
logpnT q
∆j,i
¸
. (16)
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Algorithm 3 Unknown Fakeness Budget: Fake-Oblivious Ranking with Cross-Learning (FORC)
1: Input. Parameter δ“ 1
n3T
, L“ log2pT q, and number of rounds T .
2: Output. Ranking pit, t P rT s.
3: Initialization. For all i P rns and ` P rLs, initialize the average rewards rp`qi Ð 0 and its cross-
learning version rˆ
p`q
i Ð 0 and feedback counts ηp`qi Ð 0 and their cross-learning version ηˆp`qi Ð 0.
Further, for any level ` P rLs, initialize the product-ordering graph Gp`qÐprns,H).
4: for t“ 1, . . . , T , do
5: Choose Level. Let `t be the level in round t, where Pp`t “ `q “ 2´` for ` P t2, . . . ,Lu.
Choose `t “ 1 with the remaining probability 1´řL`“2 2´`.
6: If graph Gp`tq is not eliminated, then set GÐ Gp`tq, else set GÐ Gp`q for the smallest
index `ą `t such that Gp`q is not eliminated.
7: Ranking Decision. Display the products according to ranking pit “ GraphRankSe-
lect(ηp`tq,G), and observe ct P ptHuY rns ˆ rnsq, i.e., the clicked product and last examined
position.
8: Update Variables. Let j be the last position that the customer examined. Update the
feedback counts for any i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpjqu: ηp`tqi Ð ηp`tqi `1. Then, for any i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpj´
1qu, update the average rewards: rp`tqi Ð r
p`tq
i pη
p`tq
i ´1q
η
p`tq
i
. If position j is clicked, for i“ pitpjq, update
r
p`tq
i Ð r
p`tq
i pη
p`tq
i ´1q`1
η
p`tq
i
, otherwise r
p`tq
i Ð r
p`tq
i pη
p`tq
i ´1q
η
p`tq
i `1
.
9: Update Cross-Learning Variables. For any `ě `t and i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpjqu, first update
ηˆ
p`q
i
ηˆ
p`q
i Ð
ř`´1
g“1 η
pgq
i
2`
` ηp`qi `ě `t, i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpjqu (17)
and then update rˆ
p`q
i
rˆ
p`q
i Ð
ř`´1
g“1 η
pgq
i r
pgq
i
2`ηˆ
p`q
i
` η
p`q
i
ηˆ
p`q
i
r
p`q
i `ě `t, i P tpitp1q, . . . , pitpjqu . (18)
10: Add Edges to Graphs. If for any ` where Gp`q is not eliminated, there exist i, j P rns with
ηˆ
p`q
i , ηˆ
p`q
j ą 0 such that:
rˆ
p`q
i `wp`qi ă rˆp`qj ´wp`qj (19)
add a directed edge pi, jq to Gpgq (i.e., Gpgq Ð Gpgq Y pi, jq) for all g ď ` where Gpgq is not
eliminated. Here, for any i P rns, wp`qi fi
c
3
2
logp 4nTδ q
ηˆ
p`q
i
` logp 2Lδ q`4
ηˆ
p`q
i
.
11: Eliminate graphs. If graph Gp`q has a cycle for any ` P rLs eliminate Gpgq for any gď `.
12: end for
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Proof of Theorem 3 Throughout this proof, in order to track the variables over time, we denote
the values of r
p`q
i , η
p`q
i , rˆ
p`q
i , ηˆ
p`q
i , and w
p`q
i (for i P rns and ` P rLs), at the end of round t P rT s by rp`qi,t ,
η
p`q
i,t , rˆ
p`q
i,t , ηˆ
p`q
i,t , and w
p`q
i,t , respectively. Recall from Step 9 of Algorithm 3 that rˆ
p`q
i is the cross-learned
empirical reward for product i corresponding to level `, which is derived via a weighted average
of the reward from level ` (weight: 1) and levels smaller than ` (weight: 1
2p`q ); ηˆ
p`q
i denotes the
cross-learned feedback count, which is defined analogously.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we start our analysis by decomposing the regret into a sum
of pairwise regrets using Lemma 1. However, we further partition the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq into two
parts based on whether the learning level sampled in round t is greater or less than `‹ fi rlog2pF qs.
RegT ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,iE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ff
“ F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,i
˜
E
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q
ff
`E
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ff¸
,
(20)
Recall that `t denotes the learning level sampled in round t and that E
”řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqq
ı
is the expected number of times that our algorithm misplaces an inferior product i in position j ă i
when the customer is real and ends up examining this product. In the rest of the proof, we separately
bound the loss terms E
”řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q
ı
and E
”řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ı
.
In order to analyze the above loss terms, we first define a high-probability good event, denoted
by G, under which the product-ordering graphs for levels higher than `‹ do not have erroneous
edges. In order to define G, we first describe the following targeted event that is specific to a given
round, product, and level: for any t P rT s, i P rns, and `ě `‹, we define Gp`qi,t to be the event that
the empirical cross-learning mean rˆ
p`q
i,t , defined in Equation (17), is within a confidence interval of
width w
p`q
i,t around the true click probability µi for product i. Recall that the window size w
p`q
i,t is
defined in Step 10 in Algorithm 3. We repeat the definition here for convenience and extend it to
include the case where ηˆ
p`q
i,t “ 0. For every i P rns, t P rT s, and ` P rLs, define wp`qi,t as follows:
w
p`q
i,t “
gffe3
2
logp 4nT
δ
q
maxpηˆp`qi,t ,1q
` logp
2L
δ
q` 4
maxpηˆp`qi,t ,1q
(21)
Event Gp`qi,t is then defined as follows:
Gp`qi,t fi trˆp`qi,t ´wp`qi,t ď µi ď rˆp`qi,t `wp`qi,t u . (22)
Now, we are ready to define event G:
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Definition 1 (Event G). Let G1 fi
Ş
tPrT s
`ě`‹
iPrns
Gp`qi,t , where for any t P rT s, i P rns, and ` ě `‹ “
rlog2pF qs, the event Gp`qi,t is defined in Equation (22). Further, let G2 be the event that in the entire
time horizon, any level `ě `‹ is exposed to at most logp2L
δ
q ` 3 fake users. We define the event G
to be the intersection of G1 and G2, i.e., G fi G1XG2.
In the following lemma, we show that event G occurs with high probability:
Lemma 6 (Lower Bounding PpGq). The probability of event G, as in Definition 1, is at least
1´ δ, where δ“ 1
n3T
.
The proof of the lemma is deferred to Appendix D.3. Here, we sketch the main arguments.
Note that by definition, under event G, event G2 which we analyzed in Lemma 5 also holds. More
specifically, under event G2, the effective fakeness budget for levels `ě `‹ is logp2Lδ q ` 3. This, in
turn, ensures that we have set the confidence intervals, i.e., w
p`q
i,t , to be large enough to account
for the effective fakeness budget that a learning level `ě `‹ is exposed to. Using this observation,
we can establish a concentration result similar to Lemma 2 to bound the probability of event G1
conditioned on G2. Recall that G “ G1XG2. Finally note that in Lemma 5, we show that event G2
also occurs with high probability. This leads to our result in Lemma 6.
Utilizing the regret decomposition in Equation (20) and event G, the rest of the proof consists
of three parts which we summarize in the following three lemmas. As in Theorem 2, we also define
constants pγj,iqj,iPrns that capture the minimum number of plays for any pair of products so that
the window size or confidence interval is smaller than the gap in rewards ∆j,i. Formally, for any
given j, i P rns, we have that:
γj,i fi
64 logp4nT {δq
∆2j,i
. (23)
Lemma 7 (Upper Bounding Loss for `ě `‹ under Event G). For any j ă i, we have
PpGqE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q
ˇˇˇˇ
G
ff
ď 64L logp4nT {δq
∆2j,i
,
where event G is defined in Definition 1, δ“ 1
n3T
, and L“ log2pT q.
Lemma 7 shows that under the good event G, the expected total loss of our FORC algorithm
due to misplacing product i in position j ă i over all the rounds t with `t ě `‹ does not depend
on the fakeness budget F and is upper bounded by 64 logp4nT {δq
∆2j,i
L“Op logpnT q
∆2j,i
logpT qq. To show this
result, we first establish that under event G, at any level ` ě `‹, (a) the product-ordering graph
Gp`q does not contain any erroneous edge and (b) the graph has the correct edge between any
two products i and j after obtaining enough feedback from them i.e., when ηˆ
p`q
i,t , ηˆ
p`q
j,t ě γj,i, where
γj,i is defined in Equation (23). We further show that the only reason for mistakenly placing
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product i in position j ă i is lack of sufficient feedback. These results then allow us to bound
E
”řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q
ˇˇGı. In particular, we show that after obtaining γj,i rounds of
feedback on product i, under the event G and learning level `ě `‹, event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq does not
happen, where j ă i. Recall that for any j ă i, event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq holds when we place product i
in position j and we receive feedback on product i from a real customer.
Lemma 8 (Upper Bounding Loss for `ă `‹ under Event G). For any j ă i, we have
PpGqE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇˇ
G
ff
ď jF p8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2Tδq ,
where event G is defined in Definition 1, δ“ 1
n3T
, and γj,i is defined in Equation (23).
The proof of Lemma 8 differs substantially from our previous analysis and crucially uses the
downward and upward cross-learning mechanisms included in the FORC algorithm. We dedicate
Section 6.1 to highlighting some of the main ideas. But first, we finish the proof of Theorem 3 by
stating an upper bound on the loss when event G does not hold.
Lemma 9 (Upper Bounding Loss under Event Gc). Let event Gc be the complement of
event G, specified in Definition 1. We have
PpGcq
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
∆j,iE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq
ˇˇˇ
Gc
ff
ď 1
n2
.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the exact same steps as the derivation in (12)—which establishes an
upper bound for the loss under event Ec in the proof of Theorem 2—and is therefore omitted. Recall
that since event G holds with probability at least 1´ δ, we have that PpGcq ď δ“ 1
n3T
. Putting the
upper bounds established in the above three lemmas back into Equation (20), we complete the
proof of Theorem 3 as follows:
RegT ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
PpGq∆j,iE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇˇˇ
G
ff
`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
PpGq∆j,iE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q
ˇˇˇˇ
G
ff
`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
PpGcq∆j,iE
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq
ˇˇGcff
ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
ˆ
64 logp4nT {δq
∆j,i
pL` 9jF ` 8njF q` 2δjFT
˙
` 1
n2
ď F `
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
64 logp4nT {δq
∆j,i
pL` 9jF ` 8njF q` δn3FT ` 1
n2
.
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Substituting δ“ 1
n3T
, we get the desired regret bound:
RegT ď 2F ` 1`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
64 logp4nT {δq
∆j,i
pL` 9jF ` 8njF q
“O
˜`
n2F ` logpT q˘ nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
logpnT q
∆j,i
¸
,
where the last equation holds because L“ log2pT q.
6.1. Proof Ideas of Lemma 8
In Lemma 8, we aim to bound E
”řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı, which is the expected number
of rounds that a learning level smaller than `‹ is sampled and an inferior product i is misplaced
in position j ă i for a real customer, who in turn, provides feedback on that product. Similar to
Lemma 4, we wish to show that such misplacement can only happen if we do not have enough
samples from product i. To do so, we relate the number of samples from product i in levels smaller
than `‹ to its counterpart in level `‹—this is made possible since level `‹ “ rlog2pF qs is sampled
independently with probability at least 1
2F
and the probability of sampling any lower level cannot
exceed one. Further, the number of times we receive feedback on product i is easier to characterize
for level `˚ since the product-ordering graph corresponding to this level does not contain any
incorrect edges.
To that end, we consider an arbitrary instantiation of our algorithm and define two milestones
for product i in level `‹. We show that in any round t that occurs after product i reaches these
two milestones, the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq does not happen for any level `t ă `‹.
Definition 2 (First Milestone Tj). Define Tj as the smallest round t in which ηˆp`
‹q
i,t ě 4γj,i,
where ηˆ
p`‹q
i,t and γj,i are respectively defined in Equations (17) and (23).
In words, Tj denotes the first time that the number of cross-learned samples for product i in level
`‹ crosses 4γj,i. Thus, by definition, in round Tj, ηˆp`
‹q
i,t is upper bounded by 4γj,i`1, since it cannot
increase by more than one in any round. Upward cross-learning (see definition of ηˆ
p`‹q
i,t in Step 9 of
Algorithm 3) then enables us to use this upper bound on ηˆ
p`‹q
i,t to establish an upper bound on the
number of samples for product i in lower levels.9. To see why, note that for any t P rT s, we have
`‹´1ÿ
`“1
η
p`q
i,t ď 2`‹ ηˆp`
‹q
i,t ď 2F ηˆp`
‹q
i,t , (24)
where the first inequality follows from the definition of the cross-learning variables and the second
one follows from the observation that 2`
‹ ď 2F . Furthermore, having a sufficient number of samples
for product i at level `‹ (since ηˆp`
‹q
i,Tj ě 4γj,i) is a prerequisite for adding (correct) edges to the
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product-ordering graph Gp`
‹q containing this product—this follows from arguments similar to those
used in the proof of Lemma 7
Next, we proceed to introduce a second milestone whose definition relies on the construction
of the product-ordering graph in level `‹. In particular, for all j ě 1, define Sj fi ti1, i2, . . . , iju
as the set of the first j products (chronologically) that product i forms outgoing edges to in the
product-ranking graph Gp`
‹q. For consistency, we also define S0 “ H. Next, for a given i P rns,
define Gapip∆q “ tk | ∆k,i ě ∆2 u—i.e., this set includes any product better than i (k ă i) whose
reward-gap to i is at least half as much as the input parameter ∆. We are now ready to define the
second milestone.
Definition 3 (Second Milestone Uj). Define Uj as the smallest round t in which the fol-
lowing inequality holds:
max
kPGapip∆j,iqzSj´1
!
η
p`‹q
k,t
)
ě 4γj,i, (25)
where γj,i is defined in Equation (23).
Just as Tj represents the first time that we see 4γj,i samples on product i, Uj represents the
first time that we see 4γj,i samples on a product “comparable” to j; i.e., a product whose gap to
product i is at least half of the corresponding gap between product i and product j. Our insistence
on 4γj,i samples (as opposed to just γj,i) stems from this halving of the reward gap since γk,i for
any k P rns is inversely proportional to the square of ∆k,i as can be gleaned from Equation (23).
Equipped with these two milestones, we finally define sTj as the maximum of Tj and Uj; that is,sTj fimaxtTj,Uju . (26)
Finally, as we will show later, product i has outgoing edges to at least j ´ 1 products by roundsTj´1. Thus, the set Sj´1 is well-defined by round sTj´1.
Then, since Gapip∆j,iq contains at least j products (rjs ĎGapip∆j,iq) and |Sj´1| “ j´ 1, the set
Gapip∆j,iqzSj´1 is non-empty, and hence Uj is well defined; see Equation (25).
Our high level argument is as follows: by round sTj “maxtTj,Uju, i.e., after the two milestones,
we have “enough” crossed-learned samples from product i in level `‹ and another product that is
better than i but not already in Sj´1. Let us call such a product σ. Using the properties of the
product-ordering graph Gp`
‹q (similar to Lemma 3), we can show that there is an edge from i to σ
at the end of round sTj. Downward cross-learning (Step 10 of Algorithm 3) ensures that the same
edge exists in all product-ordering graphs in lower levels at the end of round sTj. Consequently, for
any level `ă `‹, product i has (correct) outgoing edges to at least j products (i.e., Sj´1Ytσu), all
of which will be ranked above i since our ranking decision follows the GraphRankSelect(η
p`q
t ,G)
function. This property implies that after our two milestones, the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq does not
occur.
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Lemma 10 (Properties of sTj under Event G). Define Zi,t as the event that (a) the customer
in round t is real, and (b) we receive feedback on product i in round t. Then, for any j P t1, . . . , i´1u,
we have
E
” ĎTjÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGıďE” ĎTjÿ
t“1
IpZi,tX `t ă `‹q | G
ı
ď jF
ˆ
8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2T δPpGq
˙
,
where sTj and γj,i are respectively defined in Equations (26) and (23), and δ “ 1n3T . Furthermore,
for any instantiation, conditional on G, at the end of round sTj, product i has at least j outgoing
edges in graph Gp`
‹q.
The proof of Lemma 10 is presented in Appendix D.5. The first inequality follows from the fact
that Ar,tppitpjq “ iq ď Zi,t since the latter captures a superset of events. The second inequality is
more challenging to show. One of the main challenges in proving this inequality involves upper-
bounding the number of samples we receive for product i (which helps us upper bound
ř
IpZi,t))
when the learning level is smaller than `‹. The difficulty here stems from the fact that, due to the
frequent exposure of lower levels to fake users, their corresponding graphs may have incorrect edges.
Consequently, in those levels, product i may be placed in a disproportionately high rank which,
in turn, results in receiving ‘too many’ samples for this product. To control for the occurrence
of this scenario, we have to show that every time Zi,t is true for a level ` ă `‹, some progress
is made at level `‹ towards adding a correct outgoing edge from i—we know that such an edge
will be transferred to the lower levels via downward cross-learning. Our main technique here is a
mapping that connects receiving feedback on product i at a lower level to receiving feedback on a
product σ R Sj´1 at level `‹; see Lemma 17 in the Appendix. Secondly, we also leverage the upward
cross-learning argument from Equation (24) to show that feedback on product i at a lower level
contributes to adding a correct outgoing edge containing this product in the graph Gp`
‹q.
Finally, we show how we use Lemma 10 to complete the proof of Lemma 8. Fixing j ă i, we
divide the rounds into two groups based on sTj as follows
E
” Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı“E” ĎTjÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı
`E
” Tÿ
t“ĎTj`1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı ,
where by Lemma 10, the first term, i.e., E
”řĎTj
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq X `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı, is upper bounded
by jF
´
8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2T δPpGq
¯
. The second term, i.e., E
”řT
t“ĎTj`1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq X `t ă `‹q
ˇˇGı,
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is zero because by Lemma 10, after round sTj, product i has at least j outgoing edges in Gp`‹q.
Therefore, product i has at least j outgoing edges in Gp`q for all `ď `‹ too. As a result, the algorithm
will never place this product at position j when `t ă `‹. Note that this claim is valid even if the
graph Gp`tq itself is eliminated. This is because in any round t, (a) if graph Gp`tq is eliminated,
our algorithm would select a ranking pit based on a graph G
p`q, where ` is the smallest index for
which the corresponding graph is not eliminated, and (b) conditioned on event G, graph Gp`‹q is
not eliminated because it does not have any erroneous edges; see the proof of Lemma 7. ˝
7. Numerical Studies
In the previous sections, we proposed two algorithms for learning how to rank products in the
presence of fake users: FAR, which incorporates the fakeness budget F into its design, and FORC,
which learns the optimal ranking even without knowing F . In this section, we evaluate the per-
formance of these two algorithms in a synthetically generated setting. Simulating our algorithms
on this synthetic data serves the following purposes: (a) it provides insights into the performance
of our two algorithms on a more average, real-world inspired setting, as opposed to a worst-case
bound, (b) it allows us to test these algorithms against a benchmark algorithm, namely the popular
UCB algorithm10., and (c) it provides an opportunity to assess the value of knowing the fakeness
budget F in advance. Additionally, we use the setup presented below to further illustrate the inner
workings of the FORC algorithm and how these carefully designed steps lead to a low regret.
Setup and Parameter Choices
We begin by describing our model primitives for the underlying product ranking problem, as well
as the customer behavior, and fake users. We consider a cascading bandits scenario with n“ 10,
where all customers only examine the products in the first k “ 4 positions (i.e., qj “ 0 for all
j P rn´ 1sztku and qk “ 1), and exit if none of these elicit a click. We believe that such a cascade
model reasonably approximates customers who pay attention to the products in top ranks but
rarely pursue later products. Second, by adopting the aforementioned strict cascade model, we can
compare and contrast our algorithms against a benchmark that was developed particularly for this
setting (albeit without fake users), namely the Cascade UCB algorithm from Kveton et al. (2015).
Conditional upon viewing a product i P rns, a real customer clicks on it with probability µi. These
probabilities are chosen uniformly at random from the range r0.02,0.3s with the added constraint
that for any two products i, i1, the click probabilities satisfy |µi´µi1 | ě 0.02—this avoids degenerate
instances where the products are too similar and thus, their exact order is mostly irrelevant from
customers’ perspectives. As in Section 3, we label the products in the decreasing order of their
click probabilities.
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We assume that the fake user is particularly interested in boosting the click probabilities of two
sub-optimal products, in this case products six and seven. In the absence of the fake user, these
products would not be placed in the top four positions due to their low popularity, and thus they
lose out on many potential customers due to position bias. The fake user adopts a two-pronged
strategy similar to what we outlined in Theorem 1. In the first prong, the fake user tries to lower
the estimated click probability for competitors (e.g., products three and four) by avoiding clicks
entirely and in the second prong, the fake user only clicks on the corresponding product that they
seek to boost (product six or seven). We note that the fake user never examines products beyond
position k“ 4, so that the platform cannot distinguish them from real customers.
We consider a time horizon of T “ 2ˆ 106 users with the total fakeness budget given by F “
14
?
T « 20,000. Fake users are predominantly concentrated at the early stages of the algorithm.
Specifically, until reaching the limit on the number of fake users, F , each initial user is fake
with probability 3
4
and real otherwise. This modeling choice captures situations where the retailer
faces a new set of products and is unsure of their relative popularity, and some of these product
manufacturers hire fake users at the early stages to boost their visibility.
Given this setup, we evaluate both the FAR and FORC algorithms along with the Cascade
UCB algorithm from Kveton et al. (2015). Our choice of UCB as a benchmark is well-motivated
given the popularity of the algorithm and its variants in both theory and practice, and its optimal
performance across a wide range of environments (e.g., see Auer et al. (2002), Garivier and Cappe´
(2011), Balseiro et al. (2019)). For all three algorithms, we set the parameter δ “ 0.02 and the
window size to be
b
logp2nT {δq
η
` F˜
η
, where η is the number of times we receive feedback on a given
arm (product). Further (a) F˜ “ 0 for Cascade UCB since it does not account for fake users, (b)
F˜ “ F
2
for FAR, and (c) F˜ “ 1
2
logp 2L
δ
q for each level in FORC where L“ log2pT q.11.
Results and Discussion
Figure 3 presents the regret of each of the three implemented algorithms in comparison to the
optimal ranking pi‹ “ t1,2,3,4u for 100 simulations with the parameter choices mentioned above.12.
Our simulations lead to two core findings. First, Cascade UCB incurs linear regret for the type of
instances we study while both of our methods have regret that is sublinear in the time horizon T .
In particular, we observe that Cascade UCB quickly converges to a sub-optimal ranking that places
products t6,7u at positions j ď 4; upon convergence it continuously incurs regret until the end of
the time horizon as this ranking appeals to fewer customers than pi‹. In contrast, our algorithms
are more conservative in the early rounds but eventually converge to pi‹. This can be verified by
observing in Figure 3 that in the initial rounds, Cascade UCB outperforms both FAR and FORC
as the former rapidly converges to a ranking (albeit a sub-optimal one) while the latter algorithms
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Figure 3 Regret incurred by Cascade UCB (UCB), FAR, and FORC in comparison to the optimal ranking pi‹.
We only calculate the reward (and therefore, regret) stemming from clicks by real customers. The
shaded regions mark the 95% performance interval—i.e., in 95% of our simulations, the regret of each
algorithm lies within the corresponding shaded region.
are still learning the correct product-ordering graph. This numerical result shows that the poor
performance of Cascade UCB is not limited to a worst-case instance (as illustrated in Theorem 1)
and can indeed occur for more realistic, randomly generated instances.
Second, and surprisingly, the regret achieved by our FORC algorithm that is completely oblivious
to the fakeness budget F is better than the regret of the FAR algorithm that uses knowledge of
F . On one hand, one could take this finding as indicative of the divergence between a worst-case
bound (in Theorem 3) and the regret incurred on a more realistic instance. Yet, we believe this
highlights the salience of multi-level learning and cross-learning in achieving superior performance.
We also find this numerical observation practically appealing as knowing F in advance may not be
feasible for many ranking platforms. Next, we provide intuition on why FORC outperforms FAR
for this class of instances.
Let us first focus our attention on FORC. Figure 4 provides a representative snapshot of the
product-ordering graphs for levels one and four at two different points in time (t “ 50,000 and
t“ 150,000). We note that by round 50,000, most likely, all the fake users have already arrived.
Since level one is selected with probability at least one-half, it witnesses a majority of the fake
users, which in turn results in the addition of incorrect edges. For instance, at t“ 50,000, based
on the product-ordering graph of level one, our algorithm would always place products six and
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Figure 4 The state of the product-ordering graphs at levels one (Gp1q) and four (Gp4q) in two different rounds
(50,000 and 150,000) during a single run of the FORC algorithm. The nodes in black represent the
products that fake users promote (products six and seven). The black edges denote the incorrect edges
added due to fake users’ actions. The red edges are those that are transmitted from level four to one
by downward cross-learning; the correct edges in level four are displayed in blue dotted lines. Some
edges in these graphs have been intentionally omitted for the sake of clarity. At t“ 150,000, level one
has been eliminated as Gp1q contains at least one cycle (e.g., 1Ñ 6Ñ 1).
seven in the top positions when level one is selected as the learning level. Given that this does
not coincide with the optimal ranking pi‹, the FORC algorithm incurs high regret early in the
process. Level four however, has not collected enough samples up to round 50,000 to make edge
determinations (as evident in Figure 4).
On the other hand, by round 150,000, level four—having witnessed fewer fake users—has already
correctly determined the superiority of product one over six. Due to downward cross-learning,
this edge is then transferred to level one, leading to a cycle in Gp1q which in turn results in the
elimination of this product-ordering graph (and potentially those of levels two and three). Following
the elimination of the lower levels’ graphs, FORC quickly converges to the optimal ranking as no
fake users arrive after this point. Finally, we also highlight the importance of upward cross-learning
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here: given that level four is chosen with low probability (i.e., 1
16
), it is unlikely that it would
receive sufficient feedback on products one and six by round 150,000. However, after the arrival
of all fake users (which occurs before round 50,000), level one receives a large number of samples
corresponding to these products, all of which are from real users. Upward cross-learning enables
FORC to successfully use these samples to derive a tighter estimate for the given products at level
four, which expedites the formation of the correct edge between products one and six, eventually
leading to the elimination of the product-ordering graph at level one.
In contrast, the FAR algorithm does not utilize multi-level learning and takes much longer to
add the correct edges to its product-ordering graph, and consequently converge to the optimal
ranking. Specifically, the actions of the fake users lead the algorithm to initially overestimate the
popularity of products six and seven, and underestimate that of other products; the algorithm
then requires a large number of samples from real customers to recover from this manipulation
and identify, for example, that product one dominates product six. Arguably, FAR’s slower conver-
gence compared to FORC could be partially attributed to its large window size. However, due to
this larger window size, FAR never includes incorrect edges in its product-ordering graph, unlike
Cascade UCB. Further, additional numerical analyses (omitted for the sake of brevity) highlight
the importance of this conservative approach as lowering the window size increases the possibility
that FAR converges to a sub-optimal ranking.
We complete this section by discussing the generalizability of these results. Although our obser-
vations pertain to a specific simulation setup, we believe that these findings are broadly applicable
to a wide range of scenarios. First, the restricted Cascade model (customers exit at position k)
is not essential for our results as the same phenomena can be recreated even when the exit prob-
abilities are non-zero across all n positions. That is, once the fake user suppresses the empirical
rewards of certain products, UCB and other traditional learning algorithms would place these at
lower positions, and the ensuing position bias would lead to fewer clicks, and slow recovery. Second,
in practice, one would expect the click probabilities to be smaller and closely clustered. Such a
scenario would actually favor fake users as the smaller reward gap (i.e., ∆j,i) implies that fewer
fake clicks are needed to boost the position of an inferior product. At the same time, there is a
trade-off involved as the resulting ranking would not be too sub-optimal (due to products’ rewards
being close to each other), and hence a longer time horizon is required to achieve the same regret
levels as in Figure 3. Finally, altering the arrival and behavior of fake users may affect our results,
e.g., all three algorithms would perform better if the fake users always click on products and arrive
later in time. In that sense, our results could be interpreted as arising from the adversarial actions
of fake users—this provides valuable insights as in reality, one would expect the fake users to be
adaptive and employ whatever strategy provides them with the maximum benefit.
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8. Concluding Remarks
As the volume and granularity of available data increases at an unprecedented rate, many platforms
rely on data-driven algorithms to optimize their operational decisions. Moving to a data-centric
environment, however, can put online platforms in a vulnerable situation when the generated data
is prone to manipulation. Indeed, as we show in this work, popular learning strategies such as those
based on upper confidence bound ideas are not particularly robust to fake users, whose actions
may mislead the algorithm to make poor decisions. In the context of product ranking specifically,
such sub-optimal decisions may result in the most visible positions being occupied by unpopular
products, which in turn, can significantly hurt customer engagement and other metrics of interest.
Motivated by these challenges, we develop new algorithms that are robust to the actions of fake
users and converge to the optimal product ranking, even when we are completely oblivious to the
identity and number of fake users. While many recent works (e.g., see Ursu (2016)) have explored
how position bias can prevent platforms from accurately inferring customer preferences, ours is
among the first to highlight how sellers can exploit this in their favor by employing fake users, and
develop constructive solutions for preventing such a situation.
At a high level, our work presents a number of insights on how to design methods for uncertain
environments to guarantee robustness in the face of manipulation. These include: (a) being more
conservative in inferring key parameters and changing decisions based on limited data; (b) employ-
ing parallelization and randomization to limit the damage caused by fake users; and (c) augmenting
a conservative approach via cross-learning. We believe that the ideas proposed in this work can
serve as a starting point for designing robust data-driven algorithms to tackle other operational
challenges.
Our work opens up a number of avenues for future investigation. A natural direction is to
pursue the design of algorithms resilient to manipulation for alternative customer choice models
and objective functions. While the exact details of the algorithm may be context specific, as stated
earlier, the general insights provided in this work could be valuable in other settings as well.
More generally, modeling other channels through which fake users can manipulate a platform’s
ranking algorithm (e.g., fake orders, fake reviews) and developing learning algorithms that ensure
robustness to multiple sources of manipulation is a key challenge for many platforms. In this regard,
developing prescriptive solutions for product ranking in presence of fake users, as we do in this
paper, could complement the recent body of work that has analyzed this problem from a more
descriptive or passive angle (Luca and Zervas 2016, Ivanova and Scholz 2017, Jin et al. 2019).
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Appendix A: Model: Alternative Notions of Regret
In our notion of regret, we only consider real customers. Recall that for any fixed policy P “ pPtqtPrT s followed
by the fake users, we define RegT pP q “ EHT ppi‹q
”řT
t“1 Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHT ppitq
”řT
t“1 Cr,tppitq
ı
. In this expression,
the realization of the histories depend on the randomness in the clicks and exit positions of the customers as
well as the fake users (if P is not deterministic), and any randomness in the algorithm itself. The relationship
between our definition of regret and one where fake users are included is formalized below:
RegT pP q “EHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHT ppitq
” Tÿ
t“1
Cr,tppitq
ı
ěEHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
pCr,tppi‹q` Cf,tppi‹qq
ı
´EHT ppitq
” Tÿ
t“1
pCr,tppitq` Cf,tppitqq
ı
´EHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
Ipuser t is fakeq
ı
ěEHT ppi‹q
” Tÿ
t“1
pCr,tppi‹q` Cf,tppi‹qq
ı
´EHT ppitq
” Tÿ
t“1
pCr,tppitq` Cf,tppitqq
ı
´F
Recall from our definition of Cf,tppiq that EHT ppi‹q
”řT
t“1 Ipuser t is fakeq
ı
“ EHT ppi‹q
”řT
t“1 Cf,tppi‹q
ı
—
this gives rise to the second inequality above. Based on the final line, we can conclude that
the difference between our notion of regret RegT pP q and one where fake users are included, i.e.,
EHT ppi‹q
”řT
t“1 pCr,tppi‹q` Cf,tppi‹qq
ı
´EHT ppitq
”řT
t“1 pCr,tppitq` Cf,tppitqq
ı
, is at most the fakeness budget F .
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
We now formally prove that for the two-product instance described in Section 4, UCB incurs linear regret.
Suppose that the click probabilities for the products are given by µ1 “ 1 and µ2 “ 1{2, and the exit probability
is q1 “ 1—i.e. the customer only ever observes the product in the first position and never moves on to the
product in the second position. Since we only have two products and customers exit after the first position,
computing a product ranking is equivalent to simply selecting a single product for the top position, and
receiving feedback only on this product. The total fakeness budget for this instance is F “ 4 log2pT q and the
fake users’ actions are as described in Figure 1. In particular, the fake users who arrive in the first 2 log2pT q
rounds of the time horizon do not click on any product and exit after the first position (so as to appear
similar to a real customer). The second wave of fake users who arrive in the subsequent 2 log2pT q rounds
always click on product two if it is in the first position; if not, the fake user will not click on any product
and exit after the first position. We assume that the time horizon T is sufficiently large, and expand on this
later.
Our main claim is that after such a sequence of fake users, with high probability, the UCB algorithm
will present the sub-optimal ranking pi given by pip1q “ 2 and pip2q “ 1 (henceforth referred to as p2,1q) for
the remaining T ´ 4 log2pT q rounds, in which only real customers arrive. On the other hand, the optimal
ranking pi‹ is given by pi‹p1q “ 1 and pi‹p2q “ 2 (henceforth referred to as p1,2q). Note that the optimal
ranking achieves a reward of one per-round since all real customers click on the first product, and pi, in
expectation, leads to a click with probability 1
2
. Therefore, the regret achieved by selecting ranking pi in the
final T ´ 4 log2pT q rounds is ΩpT q (recall that regret is only computed for real customers).
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To prove this claim, we will first characterize the state of the UCB algorithm after the first and second
waves of fake users respectively. First, let us recall that in any given round, the UCB algorithm tracks the
empirical mean rewards µˆi and feedback counts ηi for i P t1,2u and selects the product with the highest
upper confidence bound given by Equation (27) for the first position.
UCBi “ µˆi`
d
logT
ηi
, i P t1,2u. (27)
Based on this, we argue that:
1. After the first 2 log2pT q rounds containing only fake users, UCB has received feedback on both products
exactly log2pT q times. In particular, during any round t P r1,2 log2pT qs, the empirical average reward
of both products will be zero since the fake users within this period never click on any product.
Therefore, the algorithm always selects the product with a smaller feedback count in the top position
as it maximizes the upper confidence bound given in Equation (27); ties are broken arbitrarily.
2. During the subsequent 2 log2pT q rounds, we claim that the ranking p2,1q is played at least half of
the time—i.e., product two is selected by the UCB algorithm for at least log2pT q rounds when t P
r2 log2pT q`1,4 log2pT qs. To see why, note that the empirical average reward of product two within this
period is at least as high as that of product one, since the fake users never click on the latter. In fact,
the empirical click probability for product one remains at zero. Then, it is not hard to see that UCB
would place product two in the top position at least whenever the feedback count on this product is
smaller than that of the other product (and arguably in other rounds as well). The feedback count of
product one cannot be larger than that of product two for more than half the rounds during this phase
given that both products started out with η1 “ η2 “ log2pT q at t“ 2 log2pT q. It follows that UCB will
select the ranking p2,1q at least log2pT q times.
We now summarize the state of the algorithm—empirical rewards and feedback counts—at round t “
4 log2pT q after the departure of the last fake user. As per our earlier arguments, we have that:
Product One : µˆ1 “ 0, η1 ě log2pT q, (28)
Product Two : µˆ2 ě 1
2
, η2 ě 2 log2pT q. (29)
Observe that µˆ2 ě 12 is due to the fact that exactly log2pT q users examine but do not click on product
two (first wave), whereas at least log2pT q users click on this product (second wave). Plugging this into
Equation (27), we get that at the end of t“ 4 log2pT q rounds: UCB1 ď 1{?logT , and UCB2 ě 1{2.
In order to complete this proof, we finally show that, with high probability, the UCB algorithm will never
play the ranking p1,2q for the remaining T ´4 log2pT q rounds where real customers arrive, and consequently,
never receives feedback on product one. First, note that our claim stating ‘the UCB algorithm will never
select product one for the top position’ during t P r4 log2pT q ` 1, T s is equivalent to saying UCB1 ăUCB2;
moreover, UCB1 ăUCB2 is certainly true at the end of t“ 4 log2pT q. Using Chernoff bounds and the fact
that µ2 “ 12 , we will now prove that with high probability µˆ2 ě 1?logT for the remaining rounds. Since
UCB2 ą µˆ2, this in turn implies that product one will never be placed in the top position leading to linear
regret.
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Let αt be the probability that in round 4 log
2pT q` t, the ranking p1,2q is chosen or equivalently product
one is placed in the top position. From our upper bound above, we know that Ppαtq ă Ppµˆ2 ăUCB1q. We
will show that for sufficiently large T (T ě e16), Ppαtq ď 1{T 2 for any given t P r1, T ´ 4 log2pT qs. Therefore,
by the union bound, the probability that the ranking p1,2q is ever chosen in the final T ´ 4 log2pT q rounds
is at most 1
T
. In terms of regret, this implies that with probability p1´ 1
T
q, UCB incurs an expected regret
of 1
2
pT ´ 4 log2pT qq, and therefore:
RegT “ 1
2
p1´ 1
T
qpT ´ 4 log2pT qq “ΩpT q
To bound the probability of αt, note first that if tď 2 log2pT q, then it is impossible for the empirical click
probability of product two—i.e., µˆ2—to drop below
1?
logpT q since the empirical click probability of product
two after 4 log2pT q rounds is at least 1{2 according to (29); even if all t samples resulted in no click for this
product, the empirical probability cannot drop below 1
4
since the algorithm has recorded at least log2pT q
clicks for this product (from fake users).
More generally, the above argument implies that in order for µˆ2 ă 1?
logpT q to be true at some point
during the algorithm, we require at least 2 log2pT q samples after round 4 log2pT q during which the customer
examines but does not click on product two. With this in mind, fix an arbitrary tě 2 log2pT q: it is not hard
to see that if µˆ2 ă 1?
logpT q after round t, then the average reward corresponding to product two from the
samples obtained during the t rounds r4 log2pT q`1,4 log2pT q` ts cannot be larger than 1?
logpT q—once again,
this follows from (29), since the empirical reward was at least 1
2
after round 4 log2pT q. However, given that
these customers are real, each sample is simply an independent Bernoulli random variable with mean 1
2
;
denote the i–th such sample obtained during the above period by Xi. Suppose that we have k ě 2 log2pT q
samples13. corresponding to product two which were obained during the rounds r4 log2pT q`1,4 log2pT q` ts.
By Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability that the sum of k such Bernoulli variables is at most p1{2´ εqk is
given by:
P
˜
kÿ
i“1
Xi ď p1{2´ εqk
¸
ď expp´2ε2kq.
In our case, ε“ 1{2´ 1{alogpT q ě 1{4 since T ą e16, so
Ppαtq ď Ppµˆ2 ă 1{
a
logpT qq ď P
˜
kÿ
i“1
Xi ď 1a
logpT qk
¸
ď expp´k{8q.
Since k ě 2 log2pT q ě 32 logpT q, we have that expp´k{8q ď e´4 logpT q “ 1
T4
ď 1
T2
as desired. The theorem
statement therefore follows. ˝
Appendix C: Proof of Statements in Section 5
In this section, we present the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2, followed by the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4.
C.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Fix any arbitrary round t. Let htppi‹q “Htppi‹qzHt´1ppi‹q and similarly htppitq “HtppitqzHt´1ppitq. That is,
htppitq consists of the ranking in round t, pit, the binary variable ft, indicating if the fake user is present in
round t, and ct, which includes the product clicked on in round t (if any) and the exit position if not. Since
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the actions occurring after round t do no affect the reward in this round, the incremental regret from this
round can be written as:
EHT ppi‹q
”
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHT ppitq
”
Cr,tppitq
ı
“EHtppi‹q
”
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´EHtppitq
”
Cr,tppitq
ı
.
Note that we have replaced HT ppi‹q and HT ppitq with Htppi‹q and Htppitq respectively. Further, by the law of
total expectation, we have:
EHtppi‹q
”
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
“EHt´1ppi‹q
”
Ehtppi‹qrCr,tppi‹q | Ht´1ppi‹qs
ı
(30)
EHtppitq
”
Cr,tppitq
ı
“EHt´1ppitq
”
EhtppitqrCr,tppitq | Ht´1ppitqs
ı
. (31)
Consider any arbitrary instantiations ofHt´1ppi‹q andHt´1ppitq. Given these instantiations, and a fixed policy
Pt for the fake user in round t, we recall that htppitq depends only on the randomness in Pt and conditional
upon the customer being real, the randomness in her click behavior. For this fixed instantiation, the regret
in round t can be expressed in the form:
Ehtppi‹q,htppitq
“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq‰. (32)
We omit the conditional operator inside the expectation to keep the notation readable. Let ftppi‹q and ftppitq
denote the events that htppi‹q and htppitq contain a fake user in round t respectively—i.e., ftppitq “ 1 when
our algorithm sees a fake user in round t under htppitq. The rest of the proof proceeds in two cases depending
on the realized value of ftppitq.
• Case I. ftppitq “ 1. Since Cr,tppitq “ 0 in this case, we have that:
Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq ď 1 “ ftppitq. (33)
• Case II. ftppitq “ 0. This is the main case, so we proceed carefully. For any arbitrary ranking pi, the
expected reward from a real customer can be quantified as:
E
”
Cr,tppiq | ftppiq “ 0
ı
“
nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpiprqqµpipjq .
Here,Qpjq “śj´1
r“1p1´qrq, is the probability that the customer does not exit before viewing the products
in the first j positions. By definition, pi‹pjq “ j for all j ď n. Therefore, when ftppitq “ ftppi‹t q “ 0, both
our algorithm and the optimal algorithm see a real customer in round t and the incremental regret
conditional on this can be written as:
E
“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq | ftppi‹q “ 0, ftppitq “ 0‰“ nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
«
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpi‹prqqµpi‹pjq´
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqqµpitpjq
ff
.
(34)
Next, consider the case where ftppitq “ 0 but ftppi‹q “ 1—i.e., the optimal algorithm sees a fake user in
round t. When ftppi‹t q “ 1, we have that Cr,tppi‹q “ 0 due to the presence of a fake user and therefore,
E
“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq | ftppi‹q “ 1, ftppitq “ 0‰ď 0
ď
nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
«
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpi‹prqqµpi‹pjq´
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqqµpitpjq
ff
.
(35)
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Note that the inequality above is due to the fact that the expression in (35) is non-negative due to the
optimality of pi‹.
Combining the two cases from (34) and (35), we get have:
E
“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq | ftppitq “ 0‰ď nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
«
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpi‹prqqµpi‹pjq´
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqqµpitpjq
ff
ď
nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
«
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqqµpi‹pjq´
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqqµpitpjq
ff
“
nÿ
j“1
Qpjq
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqq∆pi‹pjq,pitpjq
ď
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
QpjqIppitpjq “ iq
j´1ź
r“1
p1´µpitprqq∆j,i
“
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
E
“Ar,tppitpjq “ iq | ftppitq “ 0‰∆j,i . (36)
The second inequality follows from the fact that for any position j, the probability that a customer
does not click on any of the first j´1 ranked products is smallest under pi‹ among all possible rankings.
This is because pi‹ ranks products in the decreasing order of the click probabilities. The final equation
follows from the definition of the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq as stated in Lemma 1.
Combining (33) and (36), and plugging these back into (32), we get that:
E
“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq‰ďE“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq | ftppitq “ 1‰ ¨P pftppitq “ 1q
`E“Cr,tppi‹q´ Cr,tppitq | ftppitq “ 0‰ ¨P pftppitq “ 0q
ďErftppitqs`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
E
“Ar,tppitpjq “ iq | ftppitq “ 0‰∆j,iPpftppitq “ 0q
ďErftppitqs`
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
E
“Ar,tppitpjq “ iq‰∆j,i .
Since the above bound is valid for any arbitrary instantiations ofHt´1ppi‹q andHt´1ppitq, we can utilize (30)
and (31) and simply sum over all rounds t to get:
Tÿ
t“1
EHtppi‹q
”
Cr,tppi‹q
ı
´
Tÿ
t“1
EHtppitq
”
Cr,tppitq
ı
ď
Tÿ
t“1
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“j`1
EHtppitq
“Ar,tppitpjq “ iq‰∆j,i` Tÿ
t“1
EHtppitqrftppitqs.
To conclude, recall that the total number of fake users that our algorithm is exposed to is bounded
by F—i.e., there are at most F rounds in rT s where fake users arrive. This, in turn, implies thatřT
t“1Erftppitq | HT ppitqs ď F for any given choice of the history HT ppitq. Substituting this back into the above
expression gives us Equation (7) and the lemma statement. ˝
C.2. Proof of Lemma 2
We will first prove a more abstract claim. Let X1,X2, . . . ,XT be a sequence of t0,1u random variables such
that at least T ´F of these random variables are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with expectation µ (with
the remainder chosen adversarially). Let RS “ 1S
řS
i“1Xi be the average of the first S values in the sequence
pX1,X2, . . . ,XT q, and define
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εpSq “
c
logp2nT {δq
S
and
wpSq “ εpSq` F
S
.
We then claim that with high probability, RS P rµ ´ wpSq, µ ` wpSqs for all S P rT s. To see why, first
define a related sequence X˜S of random variables such that X˜S “ XS if XS is one of the T ´ F non-
adversarial random variables; otherwise, let X˜S be an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable with mean µ. Note
that |řT
i“1Xi´
řT
i“1 X˜i| ď F , since there are at most F adversarial random variables and Xi P t0,1u for all
i P rT s. It follows that if we let R˜S “ 1S
řS
i“1 X˜i, then |R˜S ´RS| ď FS . Therefore, in order to prove our earlier
claim regarding RS, it suffices to show that with high probability R˜S P rµ´ εpSq, µ` εpSqs for all S P rT s.
Since R˜S is the average of S i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with mean µ, we can directly apply Hoeffding’s
concentration inequality. Hoeffding’s inequality immediately implies that
P
´
|R˜S ´µ| ě εpSq
¯
ď 2 exp `´2εpSq2 ¨S˘ . (37)
Substituting our expression for εpSq, we have that
P
´
|R˜S ´µ| ě εpSq
¯
ď δ
2
2n2T 2
ď δ
2
n2T 2
This holds for any fixed S P rT s. Taking the union bound over all S P rT s, it follows that the probability
there exists an S P rT s such that R˜S R rµ´ εpSq, µ` εpSqs is at most δ2{n2T . As a corollary, we also have
that the probability there exists an S P rT s such that RS R rµ´wpSq, µ`wpSqs is at most δ2{n2T .
We now describe how to apply this to the problem at hand. Fix a specific product i. Our goal is show that
(with high probability) for all rounds t P rT s, ri,t P rµi´wi,t, µi`wi,ts. Recall that ri,t is the empirical average
reward for product i at the end of round t and wi,t “
c
logp 2nT
δ
q
ηi,t
` F
ηi,t
as per our definition in Equation (9).
Define a sequence of random variables Y1, Y2, . . . , so that Yj “ 1 if product i recevied a click during the
j–th time the algorithm received feedback on it (and Yj “ 0 if product i did not get clicked on). Note that
the length of this sequence is the number of times the algorithm receives feedback about product i, i.e., ηi,T .
If this number is less than T , pad the sequence with i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with mean µi until it
has length T .
Note that this sequence satisfies the properties of our earlier claim; it is a sequence of T random variables
where all but (at most) F are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with mean µi. Specifically, for any 1ďmď T ,
let Yi,m denote the event that 1m
řm
k“1 Yk P rµi´wpmq, µi`wpmqs; then by our above claim P
`ŞT
m“1Yi,m
˘ě
1´ δ2
n2T
. Recall that wpSq “ εpSq` F
S
, where εpSq “
b
logp2nT {δq
S
.
We are now ready to complete the proof. As mentioned earlier, our goal is to show that E holds with
probability 1´ δ2
nT
, where E “Ş
tPrT s,iPrns Ei,t and Ei,t denotes the event that ri,t P rµi ´wi,t, µi `wi,ts. We
claim that for a fixed product i P rns, if events Yi,m hold for all m P rT s, this implies that events Ei,t also hold
for all t P rT s and the same product i. This is true since ri,t is always the average of one particular prefix of
the sequence pY1, Y2, . . . , YT q; in particular,
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ri,t “ 1
ηi,t
ηi,tÿ
k“1
Yk.
Therefore, the validity of event Yi,ηi,t implies that event Ei,t also holds. Note here that ηi,t P rT s, and wi,t is
simply wpηi,tq as per our definition earlier. In conclusion, for a fixed product i P rns, we have that:
pYi,mqTm“1 is true ùñ pEi,tqTt“1 is true
It therefore follows that with probability at least 1´ δ2
n2T
, it is true that Ei,t holds for all t P rT s for a fixed
product i P rns. Taking the union bound over all n possibilities for i, we have that the event E holds with
probability at least 1´ δ2
nT
, as desired. ˝
C.3. Proof of Lemma 3
The first part of the lemma states that under event E , the graph G does not contain any inaccurate edges
in any round t. We show this result by contradiction. Let ią j. Contrary to our claim, assume that in some
round t, the graph G contains an incorrect edge from j to i. According to Condition (4), this implies that the
upper confidence bound on the estimate of the click probability of product j must be smaller than or equal
to the lower confidence bound on the estimate of the click probability of product i. However, comparing the
actual value of these two quantities, we see that:
rj,t`wj,t ě µj ą µi ě ri,t´wi,t ,
where the first and third inequality hold because we assume that event E holds. The second inequality holds
because ią j and hence µi ă µj . The above inequality shows that the upper bound on product j cannot be
smaller than or even equal to the lower bound on product i and consequently, the product-ordering graph
G will not contain the incorrect edge pj, iq.
To show the second part of the lemma, we verify that for any ią j when ηi,t, ηj,t ě γj,i, we have ri,t`wi,t ď
rj,t´wj,t. As we argued earlier, when ηi,t, ηj,t ě γj,i, it must be the case that wi,t,wj,t ď ∆j,i4 ; see our discussion
after Equation (13). Proceeding along these lines, we have that:
ri,t`wi,t ď µi`wi,t`wi,t
“ µi` 2wi,t
“ µj ´∆j,i` 2wi,t
ď rj,t`wj,t` 2wi,t´∆j,i
“ prj,t´wj,tq` 2wj,t` 2wi,t´∆j,i
ď prj,t´wj,tq` ∆j,i
2
` ∆j,i
2
´∆j,i
“ rj,t´wj,t ,
where the first and second inequalities follow from our assumption that event E holds. The third inequality
holds because wi,t,wj,t ď ∆j,i4 . Since the upper bound on product i, i.e., ri,t`wi,t, is smaller than the lower
bound on product j, i.e., rj,t´wj,t, by Condition (4), our graph should contain a correct edge from i to j in
any round t1 ě t. ˝
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C.4. Proof of Lemma 4
Consider products i, j as mentioned in the statement of the lemma and suppose that the GraphRankSelect
algorithm ranks i ahead of j in round t`1 despite it being the case that ią j. First, we note that the lemma
follows trivially if either ηi,t “ 0 or ηj,t “ 0. Indeed, if ηi,t “ 0, then the lemma holds trivially for k “ j. If
ηj,t “ 0 and ηi,t ą 0, then there will be no edge attached to product j and as such, our algorithm will select
j ahead of i, so the condition mentioned in the lemma cannot be true. For the rest of this proof, we will
assume that ηi,t, ηj,t ą 0.
Since event E holds, by Lemma 3, the graph G does not contain any erroneous edges. This implies that
there is no edge between i and j in either direction in the graph at this time. Indeed an edge from j to i
would be an incorrect edge and an edge going from i to j would lead to j being ranked ahead of i, which
violates the conditions of the lemma.
Now, during the execution of GraphRankSelect, suppose that product i was added to position r in
pit`1 (i.e., pit`1prq “ i) and let Sr denote the set of products with no outgoing edges in Gˆ (as per Algorithm 2)
at the beginning of the GraphRankSelect algorithm’s r–th iteration before product i was chosen. Our
main claim is that Sr contains some product k such that kď j. Define k to be the smallest indexed product
such that pi´1t`1pkq ą r. Clearly, kď j since pi´1t`1pjq ą pi´1t`1piq “ r by definition. Further, product k must belong
to the set Sr (i.e., have no outgoing edges in round t in Gˆ) since all the products better than product k have
already been ranked at positions smaller or more visible than r and graph G (and consequently graph Gˆ) does
not have any erroneous edges. Then, since i, k P Sr, we must have, ηi,t ď ηk,t because GraphRankSelect
selects the product with the smallest feedback count (η value) when multiple products have no outgoing
edges.
Part (c) of the lemma now follows trivially from Lemma 3 because if it were true that ηk,t ě ηi,t ě γk,i,
then according to Lemma 3, there would be an edge from product i to product k at the end of round t,
which is a contradiction. This concludes our proof of the lemma. ˝
Appendix D: Proof of Statements in Section 6
In this section, we first present the proof of Lemma 5 and a corollary of this lemma. We then provide the
proof of Lemmas 6, 7, and 10.
D.1. Proof of Lemma 5
In order to show Lemma 5, we first establish the following auxiliary lemma that proves the same claim but
for each individual level `ě log2pF q.
Lemma 11. For any policy P adopted by the fake users with fakeness budget F and any given δ P p0,1q,
with probability 1´ δ
2L
, any level `ě log2pF q is exposed to at most logp2Lδ q`3 fake users. Here, L“ log2pT q.
Proof of Lemma 11 The proof is very similar to that of Lemma 3.3 in Lykouris et al. (2018) and we only
sketch the key differences here to minimize redundancy. First, note that any level `ě log2pF q is selected with
probability 2´` in a given round and the total fakeness budget F “ 2log2pF q ď 2`. Therefore, the expected
number of fake users that any level `ě log2pF q is exposed to is at most 1. In light of this, our goal here is
to show a high probability bound on this quantity for a fixed level `ě log2pF q.
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Let ft be a random variable such that ft “ 1 denotes the presence of a fake user in round t. Note that ft
can depend on the history prior to round t—i.e., Ht´1—but is independent of the realization of the sampled
level in round t, i.e., `t. Since the total fakeness budget is F , we know that
řT
t“1 ft ď F for any realization
of the underlying randomness.
Define the random variable Y p`qt as follows:
Y p`qt fi ft ¨ Ip`t “ `q.
Note that Y p`qt “ 1 if the user in round t is fake and the level is ` and evaluates to zero if either of these two
conditions are not met.
The objective of this lemma is to obtain a high probability bound on
řT
t“1 Y
p`q
t . Consider the martingale
Xt fi Y p`qt ´E`trY p`qt | Ht´1s where E`tr¨s highlights that the expectation is w.r.t. the random choice of the
level in round t. Since Y p`qt “ ft with probability 12` , we have that E`trY p`qt | Ht´1s “ ft2` . Next, we bound the
variance of this martingale:
E`trX2t |X1, . . . ,Xt´1s “ 12`
´
ft´ ft
2`
¯2`p1´ 1
2`
q
´ft
2`
¯2 “ f2t
2`
´
´ft
2`
¯2 ď ft
2`
.
Next, we bound the total variance over all rounds as
Tÿ
t“1
E`trX2t |X1, . . . ,Xt´1s ď 12`
Tÿ
t“1
ft “ F
2`
ď 1.
Here, the inequality holds because F ď 2`.
Finally, we apply a martingale concentration inequality, i.e., Bernstein’s inequality as stated in Beygelzimer
et al. (2011). We start by repeating this lemma for convenience and then proceed with applying it to our
setting.
Lemma 12 (Lemma 1 in Beygelzimer et al. (2011)). Let X1,X2, . . . ,XT be a sequence of real-valued
random numbers. Assume, for all t, that Xt ďR and that ErXt|X1, . . . ,Xt´1s “ 0. Also, let
V “
Tÿ
t“1
ErX2t |X1, . . . ,Xt´1s.
Then, for any ą 0:
P
´ Tÿ
t“1
Xt ąR logp1{q` e´ 2
R
.V
¯
ď 
Applying the above lemma to our setting—in which we can set R to be 1 and V to be 1—we get that with
probability 1´ , we have řT
t“1Xt ď logp 1 q ` 1. Substituting “ δ2L , we can now use this high-probability
upper bound on
řT
t“1Xt to achieve the desired result on
řT
t“1 Y
p`q
t , which denotes the number of fake users
that level ` is actually exposed to.
Tÿ
t“1
Y p`qt “
Tÿ
t“1
Xt`
Tÿ
t“1
E`trY p`qt | Ht´1s
ď
Tÿ
t“1
ft
2`
` logp2L
δ
q` 1
ď logp2L
δ
q` 2. ˝
With Lemma 11, we complete the proof of Lemma 5 by applying the union bound for all levels `ě log2pF q
and noticing that |t` : `ě log2pF qu| ďL. ˝
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D.2. Corollary of Lemma 5
We start with a relevant definition and then proceed to a corollary of Lemma 5, which will be utilized in
future proofs. For any product i, round t, and level `, we define τ p`qi,t as the set of rounds up to t in which we
receive feedback on product i at level `, i.e.,
τ p`qi,t fi tt1 ď t | `t1 “ `, ηp`qi,t1 “ ηp`qi,t1´1` 1u . (38)
We note that τ p`qi,t is a random set that depends on the history.
Corollary 1 (Corollary of Lemma 5). Given level `ě `‹, and conditioned on the event G2, i.e., the
event that in the entire time horizon, every level ` ě `‹ is exposed to at most logp2L
δ
q ` 3 fake users (see
Definition 1), the gap between the real reward and the observed reward for any product i up to round tď T
can be bounded as follows: ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ÿ
tPτp`q
i,t
Xi,t´ rp`qi,t ηp`qi,t
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇď logp2Lδ q` 3 .
Here, Xi,t is the reward of product i in round t, and τ
p`q
i,t denotes the rounds up to t in which we received
feedback on product i at level ` as defined in (38), δ“ 1
n3T
, and L“ log2pT q.
D.3. Proof of Lemma 6
Our goal here is to show the probability of event G “ G1XG2 is at least 1´δ“ 1´ 1n3T . Here, G1 “
Ş
tPrT s
`ě`‹
iPrns
Gp`qi,t ,
where for any t P rT s, i P rns, and `ě `‹ “ rlog2pF qs, the event Gp`qi,t is defined as follows:
Gp`qi,t “ trˆp`qi,t ´wp`qi,t ď µi ď rˆp`qi,t `wp`qi,t u .
For the sake of brevity, we also define
Gp`qi fi
č
tPrT s
Gp`qi,t (39)
for any product i P rns and level `ě `‹. Finally, G2 is the event that in the entire time horizon, every level
` ě `‹ is exposed to at most logp2L
δ
q ` 3 fake users; see Lemma 5. We begin the proof by bounding the
probability of the event Gp`qi in the following claim—i.e., for a fixed product i, and level `ě `‹, the probability
that the cross-learning empirical mean differs from the true mean of product i’s rewards.
Claim 1. Conditioned on event G2, for any given product i and level `ě `‹, event Gp`qi , defined in Equation
(39), holds with probability at least p1´ 1PpG2q δ
3
8n3T
q, where δ“ 1
n3T
.
The proof of the claim is deferred to the end. The probability that event G holds can now be derived as
follows.
PpGq “ PpG1XG2q “ 1´PpGc1YGc2q “ 1´PpGc2q´PpGc1XG2q
“ 1´PpGc2q´PpGc1 | G2qPpG2q ě 1´ δ2 ´
δ
2
1
PpG2q ˆPpG2q ě 1´ δ .
In the above expressions, we use (a) the trivial inequality that PpG2q ď 1, (b) Lemma 5, where we show
PpGc2q ď δ{2, and (c) Claim 1. Specifically, by this claim,
PpGc1|G2q ď
nÿ
i“1
log2pT qÿ
`“`‹
PppGp`qi qc|G2q ď n log2pT q ¨ 1PpG2q
δ3
8n3T
ď 1
PpG2q
δ
2
. ˝
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Proof of Claim 1 Fix product i and level `ě `‹. We begin by noting that the following event is trivially
true at any round t in which ηˆp`qi,t “ 0
Gp`qi,t “ trˆp`qi,t ´wp`qi,t ď µi ď rˆp`qi,t `wp`qi,t u .
This is because by definition—see Equation (21)—wp`qi,t ą 1 when ηˆp`qi,t “ 0. Moreover, since 0ď µi ď 1, this
implies that rˆp`qi,t ´wp`qi,t ď µi ď rˆp`qi,t `wp`qi,t . For the remainder of this proof, without loss of generality, we assume
that any round t considered satisfies ηˆp`qi,t ą 0.
Next, the cross-learning empirical mean in round t can be expressed as
rˆp`qi,t “
ř`´1
g“1 η
pgq
i,t r
pgq
i,t
2`ηˆp`qi,t
` η
p`q
i,t
ηˆp`qi,t
rp`qi,t ,
where ηˆp`qi,t “
ř`´1
g“1 η
pgq
i,t
2`
` ηp`qi,t . Note that rp`qi,t ηp`qi,t is the sum of observed rewards for product i at level ` over all
the rounds where the algorithm selects level `. Some of these observations could be from fake users. However,
we know from Lemma 5 that with high probability, at most logp 2L
δ
q ` 3 of these rounds contain fake users
and potentially corrupted rewards. Therefore, before showing a concentration inequality for rˆp`qi,t as is required
for this claim, we first prove bounds on the empirical mean (for the hypothetical case) when there is no fake
user and all of the rewards are sampled i.i.d. from a Bernoulli distribution with mean µi. We then use the
triangle equality and an upper bound on the number of fake users to transform this hypothetical scenario to
the case with fake users.
Formally, we can interpret the process by which rewards are obtained from real customers as follows.
Suppose that there two sequences of real rewards pX1,X2, . . . ,XT q and pY1, Y2, . . . , YT q of each of length T
such that:
1. All T samples in both sequences are independently drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with mean µi.
2. If our algorithm picks level ` at some round t and we receive feedback on product i during this round
from a real customer, then we observe sample Xη1,t where (for simplicity) η1,t fi η
p`q
i,t is the total number
of times we have received feedback on product i up to round t.
3. If our algorithm picks level g ă ` at some round t and we receive feedback on product i during this
round from a real customer, then we observe sample Yη2,t where η2,t fi
ř`´1
g“1 η
pgq
i,t is the total number of
times we have received feedback on product i on all levels smaller than ` up to round t.
Note that when there is a fake user in a particular round, the corresponding sample (Xη1,t or Yη2,t) is ignored
and a potentially different sample is obtained.
Consider the term:
xˆp`qi,t fi
řη1,t
t1“1Xt1
ηˆp`qi,t
`
řη2,t
t1“1 Yt1
2`ηˆp`qi,t
,
where ηˆp`qi,t “ η1,t`η2,t{2`, as defined in Algorithm 3. This quantity denotes the cross-learning empirical mean
for level ` in the absence of fake customers. We seek to apply Lemma 13 to bound the probability that xˆp`qi,t ,
defined above, exceeds its true mean. First, for any given ηą 0, define
η fi
d
3
2
logp 4nT
δ
q
η
,
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where δ“ 1
n3T
. Note that 
ηˆ
p`q
i,t
“wp`qi,t ´ logp
2L
δ
q`4
ηˆ
p`q
i,t
, where wp`qi,t is the window size as defined in Equation (21).
P
´
Dt : |xˆp`qi,t ´µi| ą ηˆp`q
i,t
¯
“ P
˜
Dpη1,t, η2,tq :
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ
řη1,t
t1“1Xt1
ηˆp`qi,t
`
řη2,t
t1“1 Yt1
2`ηˆp`qi,t
´µi
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇą ηˆp`qi,t
¸
ď P
ˆ
Dpη1, η2q :
ˇˇˇˇřη1
t“1Xt
ηˆ
`
řη2
t“1 Yt
2`ηˆ
´µi
ˇˇˇˇ
ą ηˆ , 0ă η1, η2 ď T , ηˆ“ η1` η2
2`
˙
ď
Tÿ
η1“0
Tÿ
η2“0
Ipη1` η2 ą 0qP
ˆˇˇˇˇřη1
t“1Xt
ηˆ
`
řη2
t“1 Yt
2`ηˆ
´µi
ˇˇˇˇ
ą ηˆ
˙
,
where we use ηˆ as short hand for η1` η2{2`. We now apply Lemma 13 directly on the expression in the last
inequality taking “ ηˆ “
b
3 logp 4nT
δ
q
2ηˆ
. This gives us:
Tÿ
η1“0
Tÿ
η2“0
Ipη1` η2 ą 0qP
ˆˇˇˇˇřη1
t“1Xt
ηˆ
`
řη2
t“1 Yt
2`ηˆ
´µi
ˇˇˇˇ
ą ηˆ
˙
ď
Tÿ
η1“0
Tÿ
η2“0
2 expp´3 ¨ logp4nT
δ
qq
“ 2pT ` 1q2 ¨ δ
3
43n3T 3
ď 2 ¨ p2T q2 ¨ δ
3
43n3T 3
“ δ
3
8n3T
.
Note that the second inequality is due to T ` 1ď 2T since T ě 1. In summary, we have that:
P
˜
Dt :
ˇˇˇ
xˆp`qi,t ´µi
ˇˇˇ
ąwp`qi,t ´
logp 2L
δ
q` 4
ηˆp`qi,t
¸
ď δ
3
8n3T
. (40)
Using this, we can bound the desired quantity rˆp`qi,t which differs from xˆ
p`q
i,t only in terms of the feedback
due to fake users.
|rˆp`qi,t ´µi| ď |rˆp`qi,t ´ xˆp`qi,t | ` |xˆp`qi,t ´µi|
ď 1
2`ηˆp`qi,t
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ`´1ÿ
g“1
rpgqi,t η
pgq
i,t ´
`´1ÿ
g“1
ÿ
t1Pτpgq
i,t
Xi,t1
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇˇ` 1
ηˆp`qi,t
|rp`qi,t ηp`qi,t ´
ÿ
t1Pτp`q
i,t
Xi,t1 | ` |xˆp`qi,t ´µi|
ď 1
2`ηˆp`qi,t
F ` logp
2L
δ
q` 3
ηˆp`qi,t
` |xˆp`qi,t ´µi| (41)
ď 1
ηˆp`qi,t
` logp
2L
δ
q` 3
ηˆp`qi,t
` |xˆp`qi,t ´µi| (42)
“ logp
2L
δ
q` 4
ηˆp`qi,t
` |xˆp`qi,t ´µi| .
Equation (41) follows from the following two arguments:
•
ˇˇˇř`´1
g“1 r
pgq
i,t η
pgq
i,t ´
ř`´1
g“1
ř
t1Pτpgq
i,t
Xi,t1
ˇˇˇ
ď F because the maximum number of fake samples (arising from
fake users) over all the rounds in pτ pgqi,t q`´1g“1 is at most F .
• |rp`qi,t ηp`qi,t ´
ř
t1Pτp`q
i,t
Xi,t1 | ď logp 2Lδ q` 3 as per Corollary 1, stated in Section D.2, and conditioned on G2.
Finally Equation (42) is a consequence of the fact that F ď 2` since `ě `‹ “ rlog2pF qs. We are now ready
to complete the proof. Going back to the statement of this claim and applying (40), we have that:
P
´
Gp`qi | G2
¯
“ 1´P
´ˇˇˇ
rˆp`qi,t ´µi
ˇˇˇ
ąwp`qi,t | G2
¯
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ě 1´P
˜ˇˇˇ
xˆp`qi,t ´µi
ˇˇˇ
` logp
2L
δ
q` 4
ηˆp`qi,t
ąwp`qi,t | G2
¸
“ 1´P
˜ˇˇˇ
xˆp`qi,t ´µi
ˇˇˇ
ąwp`qi,t ´
logp 2L
δ
q` 4
ηˆp`qi,t
| G2
¸
ě 1´ 1
PpG2qP
˜ˇˇˇ
xˆp`qi,t ´µi
ˇˇˇ
ąwp`qi,t ´
logp 2L
δ
q` 4
ηˆp`qi,t
¸
ě 1´ 1
PpG2q
δ3
8n3T
. ˝
Lemma 13. Fix a positive integer ` ą 0, and η1, η2 P t0,1, . . . , T u and define ηˆ “ η1 ` η22` . Suppose that
X1,X2, . . . ,XT and Y1, Y2, . . . , YT are two sequences of t0,1u-valued i.i.d. random variables with mean µ.
Given that ηˆą 0, for any ą 0, we have that:
P
˜ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ1ηˆ
˜
η1ÿ
i“1
Xi`
η2ÿ
i“1
Yi
2`
¸
´µ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇą 
¸
ď 2 expp´2ε2ηˆq .
Proof of Lemma 13 Note that since ηˆ ą 0, it must be the case that at least one of η1 or η2 is non-zero.
Since ErXis “ErYis “ µ (for all i), we have that
E
«
η1ÿ
i“1
Xi`
η2ÿ
i“1
Yi
2`
ff
“ ηˆµ .
By applying Hoeffding’s inequality (Lemma 14), it follows that
P
˜ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ1ηˆ
˜
η1ÿ
i“1
Xi`
η2ÿ
i“1
Yi
2`
¸
´µ
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇą 
¸
ď 2 exp
ˆ
´ 2ηˆ
2ε2
η1` η2 ¨ 2´2`
˙
“ 2 exp `´2ηˆε2˘ . ˝
Lemma 14. (Hoeffding’s Sum Inequality (Hoeffding 1994)) Suppose that X1,X2, . . . ,Xm are independent
random variables such that for all i, ai ďXi ď bi, and let Sm “řmi“1Xi. Then, we have that:
Pp|Sn´ErSns| ą tq ď 2 exp
ˆ
´ 2t
2řm
i“1pbi´ aiq2
˙
. ˝
D.4. Proof of Lemma 7
We first present two auxiliary lemmas that provide (a) properties of the product-ordering graphs under the
good event G, and (b) the necessary and sufficient conditions to mistakenly place product i in position j ă i
under event G. These two lemmas allow us to bound E “řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t ě `‹q | G
‰
.
Let us start by a simple observation. Recall from Equation (23) that for any ią j, γj,i is defined as:
γj,i “ 64 logp4nT {δq
∆2j,i
. (43)
Observe that for any ią j and level ` if ηˆp`qi,t ě γj,i, then by definition of wp`qi,t in Equation (21), we have that:
wp`qi,t ď
c
3∆2j,i
2 ¨ 64 `∆
2
j,i
logp 2 log2pT q
δ
q` 4
64 logp4nT {δq
ď ∆j,i
8
c
3
2
`∆j,i logp
4nT
δ
q` 4
64 logp4nT {δq
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ď ∆j,i
8
c
3
2
`∆j,i 4 logp
4nT
δ
q
64 logp4nT {δq
“ ∆j,i
8
c
3
2
` ∆j,i
16
ď ∆j,i
4
.
In the third inequality, we used the simple fact that 4ď 3 logp4q ď 3 logp 4nT
δ
q since n,T ě 1 and δ ď 1. The
final inequality follows from simple algebra, namely that: 1
8
b
3
2
` 1
16
ď 1
4
.
By symmetry, the above argument is also true for wp`qj,t when ηˆ
p`q
j,t ě γj,i. In other words, once we receive
feedback on product i (product j) at least γj,i times, its confidence interval becomes smaller than its gap
to product j (product i). This allows our algorithm to correctly add an edge pi, jq to the product-ordering
graph Gp`q, which we will formally prove below.
Lemma 15 (Properties of Graph G under Event G). Assume that event G holds. Then, for any two
products i, j with ią j and level `ě `‹:
1. In any round t, the product-ordering graph Gp`q does not contain an incorrect edge from j to i.
2. Suppose that in round t, ηˆp`qi,t , ηˆ
p`q
j,t ě γj,i. Then, the product-ordering graph Gp`q contains a correct out-
going edge from i to j in round t1 ě t. Here, γj,i is defined in Equation (23).
The proof of Lemma 15 is identical to that of Lemma 3 and we do not repeat the same steps here. Lemma
15 shows that under the good event G, the product-ordering graphs for levels larger than or equal to `‹ do
not contain erroneous edges. Further, when the amount of feedback for products i and j is large enough,
there is a correct edge between their corresponding nodes in graph Gp`q. As a consequence of this lemma, we
infer that with high probability, for any `ě `‹, the graph Gp`q is never eliminated by our algorithm as this
graph cannot contain any cycles.
This lemma allows us to show the following statement, which says under event G, any mistake in the
ranking compared to the optimal ordering must be due to the lack of sufficient feedback.
Lemma 16 (Under Event G, Any Mistake is Due to Insufficient Feedback). Suppose that the
GraphRankSelect algorithm ranks product i ahead of product j in round t` 1 for some ią j and level
`ě `‹ Conditional on event G, (i) there must then exist some kď j such that there is no edge between i and
k in the product-ordering graph Gp`q and ηp`qi,t ď ηp`qk,t, and (ii) ηˆp`qi,t ă γk,i ď γj,i, where γk,i, γj,i are as defined
in Equation (23).
Once again, the proof is rather identical to that of Lemma 4 and hence, it is omitted.
Having presented these lemmas, we proceed to bounding E
“řT
t“1 IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX `t “ `q | G
‰
for any
level `ě `‹ and ią j.
Suppose that pitpjq “ i in some round t where `t “ ` and that we receive feedback on product i from a
real customer, i.e., Ar,tppitpjq “ iq “ 1. Since ią j, there must exist at least one product better than i that is
ranked below position j. Mathematically, we can write this as:
pitpjq “ i; ią j ùñ Dr with rď j ă i s.t. pi´1t prq ą j . (44)
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Since product i is ranked above a better product r in round t, we can apply Lemma 16 with i and r. Upon
application of the lemma, we infer that ηˆp`qi,t´1 ă γr,i. Further, since ∆r,i ě∆j,i, we also have
ηˆp`qi,t´1 ă γr,i ď γj,i . (45)
Thus far, we have shown that conditional on event G, when Ar,tppitpjq “ iq “ 1 at some arbitrary round t
with `t “ `, we must have ηˆp`qi,t´1 ă γj,i, where ią j. Conditioned on event G, consider any arbitrary instan-
tiation of our algorithm, and let tp`qi,j denote the first round in which η
p`q
i,t “ γj,i. For any t ą tp`qi,j such that
`t “ `ě `‹, we claim that our algorithm would never select product i at position j. To see why, assume by
contradiction that pitpjq “ i for t ą tp`qi,j and `t “ `. Then, as per Equation (45), it must be the case that
ηˆp`qi,t´1 ă γj,i. However, this would be a contradiction since
ηˆp`qi,t´1 ě ηp`qi,t´1 ě ηp`qi,tp`q
i,j
“ γj,i.
Therefore, conditioned on G, Ar,tppitpjq “ iq “ 0 for all tą tp`qi,j . Leveraging this, we have that:
E
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iqX p`t “ `qq | G
ff
“E
»—–tp`qi,jÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq X p`t “ `qq | G
fiffifl
ďE
»—–tp`qi,jÿ
t“1
E
“
ηp`qi,t ´ ηp`qi,t´1 | G
‰fiffifl“E„ηp`q
i,t
p`q
i,j
| G

“ γj,i .
We now bound the total number of times the event Ar,tppitpjq “ iq occurs at all levels `ě `‹ as follows:
E
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq X p`t ě `‹qq | G
ff
“
Lÿ
`“`‹
E
«
Tÿ
t“1
IpAr,tppitpjq “ iq X p`t “ `qq | G
ff
ď
Lÿ
`“`‹
γj,i ďLγj,i. ˝
(46)
D.5. Proof of Lemma 10
We prove the lemma by establishing two inductive claims which we will state shortly. Before that, we
introduce a series of events which prove helpful in our analysis. Specifically, for t P rT s, we define
Gt fi
č
iPrns,t1Prts,`ě`‹
Gp`qi,t1 (47)
In words, Gt is the event that the individual events Gp`qi,t1 as defined in Equation (22) hold for all levels `ě `‹,
all products i P rns and rounds up to t. Note that G Ď Gt, for all t P rT s. With this definition, we are ready to
state our two inductive claims:
—Inductive Claim 1. ErřĎTj
t“1 IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs ď jF
´
8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2T δPpGq
¯
, where sTj and γj,i are
respectively defined in Equations (26) and (23).
—Inductive Claim 2. Conditioned on GĎTj (as defined in Equation (47)), at the end of round sTj , product
i has at least j outgoing edges in graph Gp`
‹q for any instantiation.
Recall from our definitions in Section 6 that sTj denotes the earliest round in which both the milestone
events (Definitions 2, 3) are achieved. Therefore, conditioning on GĎTj allows us to focus on histories where
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rˆp`qi,t ´wp`qi,t ď µi ď rˆp`qi,t `wp`qi,t is valid for all products i P rns and levels `ěL up to the round sTj in which both
milestones are achieved. Note that as a consequence of the second inductive claim, set Sj is formed by the
end of round sTj , where Sj fi ti1, i2, . . . , iju is the set of the first j products (chronologically) that product i
forms outgoing edges to in product-ranking graph Gp`
‹q.
We prove both claims by induction on j for a given product i. The base case follows trivially for j “ 0.
Note that sT0 “ 0. Further, because G Ď GĎTj , proving the second inductive claim also proves the second part
of the lemma.
Proof of Inductive Claim 1. For the first inductive claim, we have that:
E
” ĎTjÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
“E
” sTj´1ÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
`E
” ĎTjÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
paqď E
” sTj´1ÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
`E
” Tjÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
`E
” Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
ďE
” sTj´1ÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
`E
” Tjÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
`E
” Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,tX p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
.
(48)
Inequality (a) comes from the fact that sTj “maxtUj ,Tju. Having decomposed the regret into these three
terms, we focus our efforts on bounding each of these terms separately.
Bounding the First Term. The first term, i.e., E
”ř sTj´1
t“1 IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
can be bounded directly
by applying the inductive claim, which gives us:
E
” sTj´1ÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
ď pj´ 1qF
ˆ
8nγj´1,i` 9γj´1,i` 2T δPpGq
˙
ď pj´ 1qF
ˆ
8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2T δPpGq
˙
.
Note that the last inequality holds because γj´1,i ď γj,i according to our definition in Equation (23).
Bounding the Second Term. We show that the second term, i.e., E
”řTj
t“1 IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
, is
at most 9Fγj,i. Recall that Tj is defined as the smallest round t at which ηˆp`
‹q
i,t ě 4γj,i, and Zi,t is defined
as the event that (a) the customer in round t is real, and (b) we receive feedback on product i in round t.
Therefore, we have
E
” Tjÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
ďE
” `‹´1ÿ
`“1
ηp`qi,Tj | G
ı
ďEr2`‹ ηˆp`‹qi,Tj | Gs
ď 2FErηˆp`‹qi,Tj | Gs
ď 8Fγj,i` 2F
ď 9Fγj,i ,
60 Golrezaei, Manshadi, Schneider, and Sekar: Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users
where the first inequality follows from definition of event Zi,t and the fact that `t ă `‹. The second inequal-
ity crucially relies on the upward cross-learning: it follows because by Equation (17), we have ηˆp`
‹q
i,t ě
1
2`‹
ř`‹´1
`“1 η
p`q
i,t . The third expression holds because by definition of `
‹, we have 2`
‹ ď 2F . The fourth inequality
follows from definition of Tj : for any instantiation, it must be the case that: ηˆp`
‹q
i,Tj´1 ă 4γj,i. Then, considering
the fact that ηˆp`
‹q
i,t can grow in increments of at most one, we have ηˆ
p`‹q
i,Tj ď 4γj,i`1; see Equation (17). We note
that even if in some round t, graph Gp`tq is eliminated, we still update ηp`tqi and ηˆ
p`tq
i . The final inequality
comes from the fact that γj,i ě 2 for all i, j.
Bounding the Third Term. Bounding the third term, i.e., E
”řUj
t“ sTj´1`1 IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
, is the
most challenging part of our proof. The difficulty here stems from the fact that graphs Gp`q corresponding to
lower levels could contain incorrect edges involving product i due to fake clicks. As a result of such edges, the
algorithm may place this product at a disproportionately high rank whenever `ă `‹. This increased visibility
implies that we may receive feedback on product i a large number of times (i.e., Zi,t is large) at lower levels
when compared to level `‹ that does not contain any incorrect edge.
To control for the occurrence of this scenario, we have to show that every time Zi,t is true, some progress
is made at level `‹ towards adding a correct outgoing edge from i, which we know will be transferred to lower
levels via downward cross-learning. Our main technique here is a mapping that connects receiving feedback
on product i at a lower level to receiving feedback on a product σ R Sj´1 at level `‹.
The third term can be expanded as follows
E
” Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X `t ă `‹q | G
ı
“
Tÿ
t“1
E
“
I
`Zi,t X p`t ă `‹q X psTj´1 ă tď Ujq˘ | G‰
ď
Tÿ
t“1
PpGt´1q
PpGq E
“
I
`Zi,t X p`t ă `‹q X psTj´1 ă tď Ujq˘ | Gt´1‰ , (49)
where Gt is defined in Equation (47). To see why the inequity holds, consider a generic event Y . Then,
ErIpY q|Gs “ PpY XGq
PpGq ď
PpY XGtq
PpGq “
PpY XGtq
PpGtq
PpGtqPpGq
“ PpGtq
PpGq ErIpY q|Gts.
Our next lemma allows for a transformation from the event that `t ă `‹ to the event that `t “ `‹, which
we subsequently utilize to bound the third term. For any given round tą sTj´1, define the random variable
σt as the highest ranked product outside of Sj´1 in pit, i.e., pi
´1
t pσtq ď pi´1t pkq for all k R Sj´1. Recall that Sj
is the set of the first j products (chronologically) that i has outgoing edges to in Gp`
‹q. Note that by our
second inductive assumption, by round sTj´1, set Sj´1 is already formed.
Lemma 17. Suppose that ζt denotes the event that sTj´1 ă tď Uj. Assuming that the inductive claims hold
up to j´ 1, for the given product i and round t, we have that 14.
E rIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s ď 2FE rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s .
In particular, the lemma claims that in a round t with `t ă `‹, the probability that we receive feedback on
product i from a real customer is smaller than 2F times the probability that we receive feedback on at least
one product (σt) that does not belong to Sj´1 when `t “ `‹. The proof of the lemma utilizes the fact that
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Pp`t ă `‹q is independent of the round t or the history, and is deferred to the end. Applying Lemma 17 to
the term in Equation (49), we get
Tÿ
t“1
PpGt´1q
PpGq E rIpZi,t X p`t ă `
‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s ď 2F
Tÿ
t“1
PpGt´1q
PpGq E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `
‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s . (50)
Ignoring the
PpGt´1q
PpGq term for the moment, the expression inside the summation in the right hand side of the
above equation counts the number of rounds within the interval psTj´1,Ujs in which we receive feedback on
some product σt R Sj´1 when our algorithm selects level `‹. Recall that ζt denotes the event that sTj´1 ă tď Uj .
The right hand side of the above equation can be upper bounded as follows
2F
Tÿ
t“1
PpGt´1q
PpGq E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `
‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s ď 2F
Tÿ
t“1
ˆ
E rIpZσt,tXp`t “ `‹qX ζtq | Gs` PpG
cq
PpGq
˙
.
To see why the inequality holds, consider a generic random variable Y ď 1. Then,
ErY |Gt´1s “ErY |GsPpG|Gt´1q`ErY |GcXGt´1sPpGc|Gt´1q ďErY |Gs PpGqPpGt´1q `
PpGcq
PpGt´1q
In the above inequality, we used the fact that GXGt´1 “ G, ErY |GcXGt´1s ď 1, and PpGt´1XGcq ď PpGcq.
Next, we focus on bounding the term
řT
t“1E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Gs since PpG
cq
PpGt´1q is a small con-
stant, which by Lemma 9, is at most by δPpGq . We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 18. Assume that the inductive claims hold up to j ´ 1 and event G holds. Consider any round
t P psTj´1,Ujs, and recall that σt is the highest ranked product outside of Sj´1 in pit, i.e., pi´1t pσtq ď pi´1t pkq for
all k R Sj´1. Then, ηp`‹qσt,t´1 ă 4γj,i, where γj,i is defined in Equation (23).
Now, we are ready to bound the term
řT
t“1E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Gs.
Tÿ
t“1
E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Gs “E
” Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹qq | G
ı
ďE“ UjÿsTj´1`1pηp`
‹q
σt,t ´ ηp`
‹q
σt,t´1qIpηp`
‹q
σt,t ď 4γj,iq | G
‰
ďE“ UjÿsTj´1`1
ÿ
σRSj´1
pηp`‹qσ,t ´ ηp`‹qσ,t´1qIpηp`
‹q
σ,t ď 4γj,iq | G
‰
ďE“ ÿ
σRSj´1
4γj,i | G
‰
ď 4pn´ j` 1qγj,i ď 4nγj,i .
(51)
where the first inequality holds because (a) in any round t P psTj´1,Ujs where `t “ `‹ and we receive feedback
on some product σt R Sj´1, ηp`‹qσt is increased by one, and (b) by Lemma 18, ηp`
‹q
σt,t´1 ă 4γj,i, and hence,
ηp`
‹q
σt,t ď 4γj,i. The second inequality holds because we are adding non-negative terms by summing over all
feasible candidates for σt. The fourth inequality follows from the fact that we have at most n´j`1 products
(feasible candidates for σt) outside of Sj´1 and we are counting the number of rounds in which we receive
feedback on one of these products.
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Putting Equations (51), (50), and (49) together, we can bound the third term, i.e.,
ErřUj
t“ sTj´1`1 IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs, as follows
E
” Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | G
ı
ď 8nFγj,i` 2FT PpG
cq
PpGq ď 8nFγj,i` 2FT
δ
PpGq . (52)
where the second inequality follows from the observation that PpGt´1q ě PpGq and the proof of Lemma 9
where we show PpGq ě 1´ δ.
Combining the Bounds on the Three Terms. Combining our upper bounds for the three terms
in (48), we get that:
Er
ĎTjÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs ďEr
sTj´1ÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs`Er
Tjÿ
t“1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs
`Er
Ujÿ
t“ sTj´1`1
IpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gs
ď pj´ 1qF
ˆ
8nγj,i` 9γj,i` 2T δPpGq
˙
` 9Fγj,i` 8nFγj,i` 2FT δPpGq
ď 8njFγj,i` 9jFγj,i` 2jFT δPpGq ,
This completes our proof of the first inductive claim.
Second Inductive Claim. Here, we show the second inductive claim, namely that conditioned on GĎTj ,
product i has at least j outgoing edges by round sTj in the product-ordering graph Gp`‹q. By the inductive
claim for j ´ 1, we know that i has at least j ´ 1 outgoing edges by round sTj´1 ď sTj conditioned on G sTj´1 .
Since GĎTj Ď G sTj´1 , it suffices to show that within the interval psTj´1, sTjs, we add at least one more outgoing
edge for product i in Gp`
‹q.
Define σ fi arg maxkPGapip∆j,iqzSj´1
´
ηp`
‹q
k,Uj
¯
as the product that (a) does not belong to set Sj´1, (b) has a
reward gap of at least
∆j,i
2
to product i, and (c) by round Uj , receives the maximum amount of feedback
under level `‹. We will show that Gp`
‹q contains a correct edge from i to σ at the end of round sTj . This
follows from the following arguments:
1. Since product σ has the highest feedback count for level `‹ among the products in Gapip∆j,iqzSj´1 in
round Uj ď sTj , we have that
ηˆp`
‹q
σ,ĎTj ě ηˆp`
‹q
σ,Uj ě ηp`
‹q
σ,Uj ě 4γj,i .
The first inequality is due to Uj ď sTj and the monotonicity of the ηˆi,t values in t. The second inequality
comes from the fact that for any product k, round t, and level `, we have that ηˆp`qk,t ě ηp`qk,t as per the
definition of ηˆp`qk,t given in Equation (17) in Algorithm 3. The final inequality is due to our definition of
σ and the second milestone Uj from Definition 3. In particular, σ is defined to be the product with the
largest value of ηp`
‹q
k,Uj in the set Gapip∆j,iqzSj´1. Of course from Definition 3, we know that:
max
kPGapip∆j,iqzSj´1
!
ηp`
‹q
k,t
)
ě 4γj,i .
2. Since sTj ě Tj , we also have that ηˆp`‹qi,ĎTj ě ηˆp`‹qi,Tj ě 4γj,i. Here, the second inequality is due to our definition
of the first milestone event Tj , i.e., Definition 2.
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3. Since σ PGapip∆j,iq, we that ∆σ,i ě ∆j,i2 .
4. This in turn implies that γσ,i ď 4γj,i ď ηˆp`‹qσ,ĎTj , ηˆp`
‹q
i,ĎTj . Applying Lemma 15, we can infer the existence of an
edge from i to σ at the end of round sTj .15.
This concludes the proof of the second inductive claim that i has at least j outgoing edges by round sTj .
Noting that G Ď GĎTj completes the proof of Lemma 10. ˝
Proof of Lemma 17
Our goal here is to show that
E rIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s ď 2FE rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Gt´1s , (53)
where ζt denotes the event that sTj´1 ă tď Uj . For any t R psTj´1,Ujs, the bound holds trivially. Thus, we focus
on some t P psTj´1,Ujs under which Ipζtq “ 1, and remove ζt from all the expressions. In the following, we first
derive an upper bound on the left hand side (l.h.s.) and a lower bound on the right hand side (r.h.s.) and
show that the lower bound is greater than the upper bound. This will complete the proof.
Upper Bound on the l.h.s. of (53). Fix a round t P psTj´1,Ujs and consider any arbitrary history Ht´1
that satisfies the conditions characterized in event Gt´1. By the law of iterated expectations, we have
E rIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Gt´1s “E rErIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Ht´1XGt´1s | Gt´1s
“E rErIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹qq | Ht´1s | Gt´1s ,
where the last equation holds because we consider a history Ht´1 that satisfies the conditions characterized
in event Gt´1. Next, we bound the inner expectation, i.e., ErIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹q X ζtq | Ht´1s. Recall that
Ht´1 “ tppi1, f1, c1q, ppi2, f2, c2q, . . . , ppit´1, ft´1, ct´1qu.
E rIpZi,t X p`t ă `‹q X ζtq | Ht´1s “E rIpZi,tq | Ht´1Xp`t ă `‹qsPp`t ă `‹q
“E “IpZi,tq | Ht´1Xp`t ă `‹qX f¯tppitq‰Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t ă `‹q,
where f¯tppitq “ 1´ ftppitq “ 1 if the user in round t is real, and the first equality holds because the event
that `t ă `‹ is independent of history set Ht´1. The second equality holds because (a) event ftppitq “ 0 is
independent of the realization of `t, and (b) when we have a fake user in round t, i.e., ftppitq “ 1, IpZi,tq
is zero. Recall that Zi,t is the event that (a) the customer in round t is real, and (b) we receive feedback
on product i in round t. Next, we characterize E
“
IpZi,tq | Ht´1Xp`t ă `‹qX f¯tppitq
‰
, which is the probability
that we receive feedback on product i in round t from a real customer when `t ă `‹:
E
“
IpZi,tq | Ht´1Xp`t ă `‹qX f¯tppitq
‰“E”Qppi´1t piqq pi
´1
t piq´1ź
k“1
p1´µpipkqq
ı
.
Here, the expectation is due to the randomness in the realization of the level `t, which in turn affects the
realization of pi´1t piq, and Qpkq “śk´1r“1p1´ qrq is the probability that a real customer does not exit before
viewing the products in the first k positions. This leads to
E rIpZi,tX `t ă `‹X ζtq | Ht´1s “E
”
Qppi´1t piqq
pi´1t piq´1ź
k“1
p1´µpipkqq
ı
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t ă `‹q
ď
´
Qpjq
ź
sPSj´1
p1´µsq
¯
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t ă `‹q
ď 2F
´
Qpjq
ź
sPSj´1
p1´µsq
¯
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t “ `‹q . (54)
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The second inequality holds because for all s P Sj´1, we have pi´1t psq ă pi´1t piq since these products are ranked
above product i. Note that this inequality is valid even when graph Gp`tq is eliminated before round t.
This is because the ranking pit in such a round would still depend on a graph G
p`q for `t ă ` ď `‹, as a
result of which, product i is ranked below all of the products in Sj´1. Further, we know that graph Gp`
‹q is
never eliminated before round t, conditional on Gt´1. The final inequality comes from the observation that
Pp`t ă `‹q ď 2FPp`t “ `‹q.
Lower Bound on the r.h.s. of (53). Here, we present a lower bound on the r.h.s. of (53). Proceeding
similarly as in the previous case, we get
E rIpZσt,t X p`t “ `‹q X ζtq | Ht´1s “E
“
IpZσt,tq | Ht´1Xp`t “ `‹qX f¯tppitq
‰
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t “ `‹q
“E
”
Qppi´1t pσtqq
pi´1t pσtq´1ź
k“1
p1´µpipkqq
ı
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t “ `‹q
ě
´
Qpjq
ź
sPSj´1
p1´µsq
¯
Ppf¯tppitq|Ht´1qPp`t “ `‹q , (55)
where the last inequality holds because pi´1t pσtq ď j. This is so because there are at most j ´ 1 products
ranked above σt by definition. Recall that σt is the highest ranked product outside of Sj´1 in pit and Qpjq is
the probability that the user does not exit before position j, which is smaller than Qppi´1t pσtqq.
Comparing (54) and (55), we conclude that E rIpZσt,tX `t “ `‹X ζtq | Ht´1s ě
1
2F
E rIpZi,tX `t ă `‹X ζtq | Ht´1s, and this completes the proof. ˝
D.6. Proof of Lemma 18
Assume by contradiction that this is not the case and that ηp`
‹q
σt,t´1 ě 4γj,i. We first argue that σt R
Gapip∆j,iqzSj´1. To see why this is the case, note that as per our definition of Uj , for all tď Uj , it must be
the case that for any k PGapip∆j,iqzSj´1, the inequality ηp`
‹q
k,t´1 ă 4γj,i must hold. Recall that Gapip∆j,iq is
the set of products whose rewards are better than µi by an additive factor of
∆j,i
2
or more. Since this set
Sj´1 cannot include product σt, our only possibility is that σt RGapip∆j,iq. In simple terms, this implies that
∆σt,i ă ∆j,i2 .
Therefore, σt R rjs. Next, in round t, we know that product σt is ranked above the better products in
rjszSj´1. Given this inversion in ranking, we can apply Lemma 16 with product σt and some arbitrary
product from rjszSj´1 to infer the existence of a product u such that there is no edge between u and σt in
graph Gp`
‹q at the beginning of round t, and
ηp`
‹q
σt,t´1 ď ηp`
‹q
u,t´1. (56)
Moreover, since 4γj,i ď ηp`‹qσt,t´1 ď ηˆp`
‹q
σt,t´1 by our earlier assumption, we also have that:
4γj,i ď ηp`‹qσt,t´1 ď ηp`
‹q
u,t´1 ď ηˆp`
‹q
u,t´1. (57)
Since u is at least as good as one of the products in rjszSj´1, we can also glean that µu ě µj . Leveraging
this, we can now quantify the gap between products u and σt as follows:
∆u,σt, ě∆j,σt “∆j,i´∆σt,i ě∆j,i´ ∆j,i2 “
∆j,i
2
,
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where the second inequality follows from our earlier argument that ∆σt,i ă ∆j,i2 . The above expression, in
turn, implies that γu,σt ď 4γj,i ď ηˆp`
‹q
σt,t´1, ηˆ
p`‹q
u,t´1, where the last inequality follows from Equation (57). Applying
Lemma 15, this would indicate the existence of an edge from σt to u in graph G
p`‹q, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, tying this back to our original proposition, we conclude that ηp`
‹q
σt,t´1 ă 4γj,i. ˝
